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Opinions Actionable As Securities Fraud
Wendy Gerwick Couture*
ABSTRACT

This Article proposes a new analytical framework to apply to
statements of opinion in securities fraud cases. Although
statements of opinion form the basis of some of the most cuttingedge securities fraud claims-such as those asserted against
securities analysts and credit rating agencies-statements of
opinion do not fit squarely within the elements of securities fraud.
In particular, three issues arise: (1) When is a statement of opinion
false so as to qualify as a misrepresentation? (2) When is a
statement of opinion material? (3) And, for that matter, what is the
distinction between a statement of fact and a statement of opinion?
Courts confronting these issues apply various analytically unsound
and inconsistent tests. In response, this Article proposes a novel
approach, drawing on the policy rationales underlying securities
fraud claims, case law and scholarly commentary addressing how
to apply the elements of securities fraud to statements of opinion,
and comparable analyses in the contexts of common law fraud and
defamation. First, this Article argues that statements of opinion are
only false if both objectively unreasonable and subjectively
disbelieved. Second, this Article proposes the following new
evaluation-inference test to differentiate statements of opinion
from statements of fact: Does the statement express the speaker's
evaluation or inference of facts? Finally, this Article proposes the
following new reasonable implication test to distinguish opinions
that are immaterial as a matter of law from those that are
potentially material: Does the opinion reasonably imply an
allegedly false, material fact?
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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most compelling questions in modem securities
litigation is how to treat allegedly fraudulent statements of
opinion-such as securities-analyst recommendations, credit
ratings, and statements of corporate optimism. Much of the
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securities litigation in the wake of the stock market crash of 2000
and the financial crisis of 2008 has centered on allegedly
fraudulent opinions. After the 2000 crash, sell-side securities
analysts were widely blamed for allegedly issuing "buy"
recommendations consistent with the interests of their firms'
investment banking clients but inconsistent with their own
opinions about the covered stocks,' leading to widespread
securities litigation.2 Similarly, in the wake of the 2008 crisis,
credit rating agencies were pilloried for allegedly issuing credit
ratings consistent with the interests of their firms' clients but3
inconsistent with their own opinions about the rated securities,
also leading to securities litigation. 4 Finally, in the wake of both
crashes, many companies-including quintessential examples like
Worldcom and Citigroup-were sued by their investors for
allegedly expressing unduly optimistic opinions about their
businesses. 5
1. E.g., Joint Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, N.Y. Attorney Gen.'s
Office, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs. Ass'n, Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, & N.Y. Stock
Exch., Ten of Nation's Top Investment Finns Settle Enforcement Actions
Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking (Apr.
28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm (announcing
the finalization of a global settlement with ten firms "follow[ing] joint
investigations by the regulators of allegations of undue influence of investment
banking interests on securities research at brokerage firms").
2. E.g., In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir.
2005) (Purchasers of Agilent Technologies, Inc. stock alleged that the "buy"
ratings in Credit Suisse's analyst reports were fraudulent because the analysts
"actually believed that wise investors should not purchase Agilent securities.").
3. CONCLUSIONS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION Xxv
(2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdnmedia/fcic-reports
/fcicfinal reportconclusions.pdf ("We conclude the failures of credit rating
agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction. The three
credit rating agencies were key enablers of the financial meltdown,").
4. E.g., King Cnty., Wash. v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 708 F.
Supp. 2d 334, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Investors who purchased notes issued by a
structured investment vehicle alleged that credit rating agencies assigned
fraudulently high credit ratings to the notes.).
5. E.g., In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206, 229
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Citigroup investors premised securities fraud claims on
various alleged misrepresentations, including the CEO's statement that "I feel
good about the composition of our portfolios, not only in the corporate and
sovereign area but especially in the U.S. mortgage area where we have avoided
the riskier products at some cost to revenues in prior years."); In re MCI
Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 778, 786 (S.D. Miss. 2002)
(Worldcom investors premised securities fraud claims on various alleged
misrepresentations, including the company's statement that "[t]he local and global
reach of our network continues to set Worldcom apart from the rest of the
industry.").
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Applying the elements of a securities fraud claim to statements
of opinion as opposed to statements of fact is like fitting a square
peg in a round hole. As courts have interpreted6 § 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act and SEC Rule 1Ob-5, a private claim
for securities fraud contains the following elements: a
misrepresentation or an omission of a material fact; scienter; a
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security; reliance upon the misrepresentation
or omission; economic loss; and loss causation. 7 When these
elements are applied to statements of opinion, three issues arise:
(1) When is a statement of opinion false so as to qualify as a
misrepresentation? (2) When is a statement of opinion material?
(3) And, for that matter, what is the distinction between a
statement of fact and a statement of opinion?
Courts confronting these issues have adopted various tests that
are analytically unsound, that yield inconsistent results, and that
fail to further the fundamental policy goal of the securities acts "to
insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets." 8 For example,
without articulating why statements of opinion should be afforded
special treatment, courts routinely require that the statements be
both subjectively disbelieved and objectively unreasonable in order
to be false, effectively raising the applicable scienter level for
statements of opinion. 9 Despite the fact that the fact-opinion
distinction is thereby potentially outcome-determinative, courts
apply a series of illogical and inconsistent tests to make this
distinction.' 0 Finally, courts routinely dismiss opinions as
immaterial as a matter of law, characterizing them as mere
"puffery," even if reasonable investors could rely on the opinions
to their detriment when making investment decisions."
Several eminent scholars have criticized courts' treatment of
statements other than "plain vanilla" statements of fact. For
example, Professor Jennifer O'Hare, noting courts' inconsistent
application of the puffery defense to vague statements, has
proposed a framework to analyze the materiality of these
statements. 12 Professor Donald C. Langevoort has identified
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006 & Supp. V 2011); 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2012).
7. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 157

(2008).
8.
9.
10.
11.

15U.S.C. §78b(2006&Supp. V2011).
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B.

12. Jennifer O'Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate ReEmergence of the Puffery Defense in Private SecuritiesFraudActions, 59 OmHo

ST. L.J. 1697, 1709, 1737 (1998).
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courts' inconsistent treatment of half-truths and proposed a
framework for assessing whether half-truths should be actionable
as securities fraud. 13 Professor David A. Hoffman has proposed a
new presumed liability regime to apply to so-called puffery, which
he identifies in the securities context as "vague statement[s] of4
corporate optimism" about the future or about current conditions.1
This Article contends that this deep body of scholarship, although
apparently focused on different subsets of statements, has a
common core: statements of opinion.
In response, this Article proposes a new analytical framework
to apply to statements of opinion in securities fraud cases. This
framework draws on policy rationales underlying securities fraud
claims, case law and scholarly commentary addressing how to
apply the elements of securities fraud to statements of opinion, and
comparable analyses in the contexts of common law fraud and
defamation. First, this Article agrees with most courts having
addressed the issue that statements of opinion are only false if both
objectively unreasonable and subjectively disbelieved. The
subjective falsity requirement recognizes that there is "something
special" about opinions, which reflect the speaker's mental
processes. Additionally, in light of the consequent necessity of
differentiating between statements of fact and statements of
opinion, this Article proposes the following new evaluationinference test to make this distinction: Does the statement express
the speaker's evaluation or inference of facts? This test, which
draws on comparable precedent in the contexts of defamation and
common law fraud, pinpoints those statements that contain the
aforementioned "something special." Further, this Article responds
to courts' unsound materiality analyses of opinions by proposing
the following new reasonable implication test to distinguish
statements that are immaterial as a matter of law from those that
are potentially material: Does the opinion reasonably imply an
allegedly false, material fact? Comparable precedent developed in
the defamation pure-mixed opinion context and in the commonlaw-fraud puffery-opinion context should guide courts as they
apply the reasonable implication test in the securities fraud
context.
In order to present this proposed analytical framework, this
Article proceeds in four additional parts. Part II reviews the
precedent establishing the rule that statements of opinion are
13. Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by
Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REv. 87, 88, 113 (1999).
14. David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOwA L. REV.
1395, 1405-11, 1445 (2006).
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potentially actionable as securities fraud and explains why
statements of opinion do not fit squarely within the elements of
securities fraud. Next, Part III argues that a statement of opinion,
unlike a statement of fact, is only false if it is subjectively false
(i.e., disbelieved by the speaker). Therefore, because the
distinction between statements of fact and opinion is potentially
outcome determinative, Part III proposes the novel evaluationinference test to identify statements of opinion for purposes of
securities fraud. In Part IV, turning to the materiality of those
statements that thereby qualify as opinions, this Article proposes
the new reasonable implication test to differentiate potentially
material opinions from mere puffery. Finally, Part V summarizes
this novel analytical rubric and briefly concludes.
II. OPINIONS CAN

FORM THE BASIS OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS

Although courts occasionally state otherwise,' 5 most courts
recognize that statements of opinion are potentially actionable as6
securities fraud because they make implicit factual representations.'
In particular, a statement of opinion contains the implicit factual
representations (1) that the speaker actually holds the opinion
17
expressed, and (2) that the opinion has a reasonable basis in fact.
Indeed, in the seminal case of Virginia Bankshares v.
Sandburg, the Supreme Court soundly rejected the argument that
statements of opinion are per se not actionable under § 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act, which-as implemented by S.E.C. Rule
14a-9-prohibits false or misleading statements in proxy
statements.18 The Court's ruling has been widely applied to claims
pursuant to § 10(b) and S.E.C. Rule lOb-5, which uses virtually

15. E.g., In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 549, 557
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Likewise, statements of opinion are insufficient to form the
basis of a misrepresentation or omission complaint under § 10(b).").
16. In re Nat'l Century Fin'l Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630,
639 (S.D. Ohio 2008) ("[T]he Supreme Court has 'rejected the argument that
statements containing opinions or beliefs.., could not be a basis for' an action
for securities fraud." (quoting Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir.
1993))); In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir. 2005)
("Classifying ratings as opinions does not automatically shield them from
liability under the securities laws." (citing Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501
U.S. 1083, 1095 (1991))).
17. In re Credit Suisse, 431 F.3d at 47 ("[A] statement of opinion may be
considered factual in at least two respects: as a statement that the speaker
actually holds the opinion expressed and as a statement about the subject matter
underlying the opinion.").
18. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095 (1991).
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identical language to prohibit false or misleading statements in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.19
In Virginia Bankshares, a minority shareholder alleged that the
board of directors solicited proxies for voting on a merger proposal
by means of materially false or misleading statements of fact.20 In
particular, the shareholder alleged that the board's assertions that
the merger plan allowed the minority shareholders to achieve
"high" value and that the merger price was "fair" were materiallAy
misleading because the merger plan undervalued the shares.
Rejecting the company's argument that "statements of opinion or
belief incorporating indefinite and unverifiable expressions cannot
be actionable as misstatements of material fact, ' 22 the Supreme
Court explained that the directors' opinions were factual in two
senses: "as statements that the directors do act for the reasons
given or hold the belief stated and as statements
about the subject
23
matter of the reason or belief expressed.
Some courts have suggested that a statement of opinion makes
a third implicit factual representation: "that the speaker is not
aware of any undisclosed facts tending to seriously undermine the
accuracy of the statement." 24 This is merely a restatement of the
second implicit representation: that the opinion has a reasonable
basis in fact. If undisclosed facts tended to seriously undermine the
accuracy of an opinion, it-by definition-would lack a reasonable
basis in fact. Take, for example, the statement that "the new drug is
proving highly effective in clinical trials." If, in truth, the drug
were not any more effective than a placebo, the second implicit
representation-that the opinion has a reasonable basis in factwould be false. There would be no need to resort to the purported
third implicit representation-that the speaker was not aware of
any undisclosed facts tending to seriously undermine the
statement's accuracy. Therefore, this purported third implicit
19. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 n.2 (6th Cir. 1993) ("The court in
Virginia Bankshares was concerned with Section 14(a), not Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act. Section 14 concerns proxy statements, whereas
Section 10 concerns other statements by a corporation. Virginia Bankshares is
instructive for this case, however, because the Securities and Exchange

Commission has promulgated the same rule for each section: violations occur
under each section whenever a statement is false or a material omission makes
the statements which are made misleading.").
20. Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1088-89.
21.

Id. at 1088.

22. Id. at 1090.
23. Id. at 1092.
24. E.g., In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir.
1989).
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factual representation is duplicative, circular,25 and risks
transforming an affirmative misrepresentationcase (premised on
the allegedly false opinion) into a nondisclosure case (remised on
the failure to disclose the allegedly undermining facts).
Even though securities fraud claims can be premised on

statements of opinion, opinions do not fit squarely within the
traditional elements of a securities fraud claim.

7

First, when is a

statement of opinion false so as to qualify as a "misrepresentation
of fact"? As explained above, an opinion makes two implicit
factual representations: (1) that the speaker actually holds the
opinion expressed, and (2) that the opinion has a reasonable basis

in fact. Is an opinionfalse if one of these implicit representations is
false, or does falsity require that both be false?
25. E.g., In re Trex Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., 454 F. Supp. 2d 560, 577 (W.D.
Va. 2006) ("The analysis is somewhat circular when the plaintiffs claim that an
omission renders an affirmative statement misleading."); In re No. Nine Visual
Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D. Mass. 1999) ("[T]he Class has
cited a number of affirmative allegations that it believes are actionably
misleading based on the failure to disclose the inventory valuation problem. The
Court must ask: Are these allegations claims of nondisclosure ... or are they
claims of affirmative misstatement ... ?"). See also John S. Poole, Improving
the Reliability of Management Forecasts, 14 J. CORP. L. 547, 556 (1989)
(declining to treat the half-truth principle "as an inherent implied representation
unique to opinions and predictions").
26. In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206, 232 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) ("Nevertheless, a duty to disclose arises when disclosure is necessary to
make prior statements not misleading." (internal quotation marks omitted));
Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 248-49 (5th Cir. 2009) ("Once the
defendants engaged in public discussions concerning the benefits of Type II
affiliation and the no-deposit programs, they had a duty to disclose a 'mix of
information' that is not misleading."); In re Apollo Grp. Inc. Sec. Litig., 509 F.
Supp. 2d 837, 841 (D. Ariz. 2007) ("In other words, while Defendants may not
have an affirmative duty to disclose interim regulatory findings, they do have 'a
duty to disclose material facts that are necessary to make disclosed statements,
whether mandatory or volunteered, not misleading."' (quoting Hanon v.
Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 504 (9th Cir. 1992))). Although this
distinction might seem like parsing between two sides of the same coin, a
nondisclosure fraud case is potentially easier for a plaintiff to win than an
affirmative misrepresentation fraud case, providing for a "run-around" of the
elements of an affirmative misrepresentation case without a reasonable basis.
For one, reliance is presumed in nondisclosure cases but not in affirmative
misrepresentation cases. Moreover, the subjective falsity requirement discussed
below in Parts III.A, III.B, and III.C would arguably not apply if the claim were
premised on the failure to disclose rather than on the affirmatively false opinion.
27. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 157
(2008) (listing the elements of securities fraud as: (1) a misrepresentation or an
omission of a material fact; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance
upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation).
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Second, when does a statement of opinion misrepresent
material facts? For purposes of securities fraud, materiality
requires "a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important" in deciding how to invest.28 When
would a reasonable investor rely on a statement of opinion as
opposed to dismissing it as mere puffery?
Finally, intrinsically intertwined in the above two issues is the
most pressing question of all: What is a statement of opinion for
purposes of securities fraud? If a statement's characterization as an
opinion affected neither the falsity analysis nor the materiality
analysis, this would be a moot question. If, however, as most
courts and this Article contend, the characterization influences
both analyses, identifying precisely those statements that should be
treated as opinions is essential. Moreover, risking circularity, the
unique attributes of those statements that are classified as opinions
should help guide how the elements of falsity and materiality apply
to opinions.
To answer these three questions, this Article draws on
precedent developed in the contexts of common law fraud and
defamation. Common-law fraud, defamation, and securities fraud
share the same core allegation-the defendant made a false
statement.2 9 The implications of being a statement of opinion differ
somewhat in each context, but the precedent developed in the
contexts of common law fraud and defamation is nonetheless
instructive as courts struggle to address statements of opinion in
the context of securities fraud.
28. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976)).
29.

Stoneridge Inv. Partners, 552 U.S. at 157 (listing the elements of

securities fraud as including a misrepresentation or omission of material fact);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) ("One who fraudulently makes
a misrepresentationoffact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing
another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability
to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance
upon the misrepresentation." (emphasis added)); Id. § 538A (defining a
misrepresentationof opinion for purposes of common law fraud); Id. § 558 ("To

create liability for defamation there must be: (a) a false and defamatory
statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d)
either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence
of special harm caused by the publication." (emphasis added)). See also Brief of
Forbes LLC et al. as Amici Curiae at 28, Secs. & Exch. Comm'n v. Pirate
Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1037), 2008 WL 2307442
at *28 ("Indeed, in relevant substance, the SEC's claim is very much like a
defamation claim-it is brought to assess damages for inaccurate information
just like a defamation claim is brought to impose liability for false speech.").

390

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 73

Usually the allegedly false statements at the heart of securities
fraud and defamation are made under different circumstances. In the
paradigmatic securities fraud case, the speaker makes an unduly
rosy statement about his or her business. By contrast, in the
quintessential defamation case, the speaker makes an unduly
derogatory statement about a third party or the third party's
products. Occasionally, however, securities fraud and defamation
overlap. For example, public companies sometimes assert
defamation claims against securities analysts and news
organizations, contending that they have made unduly negative
statements about the companies, thus harming the companies' stock
price.3 ° Occasionally, the companies allege that the speakers were
motivated to increase the value of short positions in the companies'
stock or to increase the value of long positions in competitors' stock,
thus bringing 3the
alleged defamation within the scope of the
1
securities laws.
Similarly, although common-law fraud and securities fraud are
both usually premised on unduly rosy statements, common law
fraud class actions with respect to securities are usually preempted32
pursuant to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act.
Therefore, as a practical matter, common law fraud is often
focused on allegedly false statements about one's products, while
securities fraud is often focused on allegedly false statements about
one's business. Occasionally, however, large investors who need
not resort to a class action assert common law fraud claims

30. E.g., Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151 F.3d 180, 182-83 (4th Cir.
1998) (A corporation asserted a defamation action against Forbes Magazine,
alleging that a stock tip story contained false and defamatory statements about
the corporation, causing the value of the company's stock to plummet.); SPX
Corp. v. Doe, 253 F. Supp. 2d 974, 974-77 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (A corporation
asserted a defamation claim against an anonymous individual who posted
negative comments about the corporation, such as "Strong Sell," on a Yahoo!
message board.).
31. E.g., Medifast, Inc. v. Minkow, No. 10-CV-382 JLS, 2011 WL 1157625,
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2011) ("Plaintiffs... allege that Defendants engaged in a
series of coordinated attacks on Medifast and the TSFL program designed to
increase the value of a short position Defendants held in Medifast stock.").
32. 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2006) ("No covered class action based upon the
statutory or common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained
in any State or Federal court by any private party alleging.., that the defendant
used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security."); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006) ("SLUSA does
not actually pre-empt any state cause of action. It simply denies plaintiffs the
right to use the class-action device to vindicate certain claims.").
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premised 33on allegedly fraudulent conduct in connection with
securities.
Recognizing that common law fraud and defamation share a
core element-a false statement-with securities fraud, courts
sometimes cite the precedent developed in these areas as
persuasive authority in securities fraud cases. For example, in
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, a securities case, the
Supreme Court cited Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,34 a
defamation case, as persuasive authority about whether combining
misleading statements with true statements neutralizes their
deceptiveness. 35 In Dura Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Broudo, another
securities case, the Supreme Court cited "the common-law roots of
the securities fraud action (and the common-law requirement that a
plaintiff show actual damages)" in support of its holding that a
plaintiff must prove loss causation. 36 Just as common law fraud,
defamation, and securities fraud share the same core allegationthat the defendant made a false statement-they
share the
37
quandary of how to analyze statements of opinion.
III. WHAT IS AN OPINION FOR PURPOSES OF SECURITIES FRAUD AND
DOES IT MATI'ER?
This section answers two interrelated questions: (1) Should
opinions be treated specially for purposes of falsity; and (2) if so,
what is an opinion? First, Part A shows that most courts require an
opinion to be both objectively and subjectively false in order to
qualify as false for purposes of securities fraud and explains that
this effectively raises the applicable scienter level for statements of
opinion. Despite the concomitant necessity of distinguishing
statements of opinion from statements of fact, as explained in Part
B, courts do not apply a uniform test to make this distinction. Part
C argues that, consistent with most courts having addressed this
issue, an opinion is only false if it is both objectively and
subjectively so. Finally, drawing from the dual falsity implication
33. See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87 ("The Act does not deny any individual
plaintiff, or indeed any group of fewer than 50 plaintiffs, the right to enforce any
state-law cause of action that may exist.").
34.

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990).

35.

Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991).

36.

Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344 (2005). But see

Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 162 (2008)
("Section 10(b) does not incorporate common-law fraud into federal law.").
37. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538A (1977) (defining a

misrepresentation of opinion for purposes of common law fraud); Id. § 566
(1977) (explaining when a statement of opinion is actionable as defamatory).
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and the comparable precedent in the contexts of defamation and
common law fraud, Part D proposes the following evaluationinference test to differentiate statements of opinion from
statements of fact: Does the statement express the speaker's
evaluation or inference of facts?
A. Courts Treat Opinions Specially by RequiringSubjective Falsity
Recognizing that a statement of opinion is potentially
actionable as a misrepresentation of fact gives rise to a complex
problem-how to prove the falsity of a statement of opinion. In
contrast, proving the falsity of a statement of fact is relatively
straightforward. For example, the statement that "the third
quarter's profits rose by 5%" would be false if the profits actually
fell during that quarter. A statement of opinion, however, contains
two embedded factual statements: (1) The speaker actually holds
the opinion expressed, and (2) the opinion has a reasonable basis in
fact. Which of these implicit factual statements must be false in
order for the opinion to qualify as a misrepresentation? Courts
addressing this issue commonly refer to the falsity of the implicit
assertion that the speaker actually holds the opinion expressed as
subjective falsity and the falsity of the implicit assertion
38 that the
opinion has a reasonable basis in fact as objectivefalsity.
In VirginiaBankshares,the Supreme Court held that subjective
falsity alone-without objective falsity-is insufficient to establish
that an opinion is false. 39 The Court explained that allowing
subjective falsity to suffice would open the floodgates by
permitting litigation based merely on the "impurities" of an
"unclean heart." 40 Moreover, the Court reasoned that this objective
falsity requirement does not pose an undue burden on plaintiffs
because, in most cases, subjective and objective falsity go hand in
hand. 4 1 A few lower courts, however, in apparent disregard of
38. E.g., In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1229 (S.D.
Cal. 2010); Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009);
In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2005).
39.

Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1096. But see In re Credit Suisse, 431 F.3d

at 47 ("Because the plaintiffs cannot clear the subjective falsity hurdle, we need

not answer the thornier question of whether a plaintiff who challenges a
statement of opinion also must plead facts sufficient to show, from an objective
standpoint, that the statement either expressly or by fair implication contained a
false or misleading assertion about its subject matter.").
40. Id. Accord Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2011)
("This approach makes logical sense. Requiring plaintiffs to allege a speaker's
disbelief in, and the falsity of, the opinions or beliefs expressed ensures that
their allegations concern the factual components of those statements.").
41. Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1096.
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Virginia Bankshares, have stated rules that would permit mere
an opinion's falsity for purposes of
subjective falsity to establish
42
securities fraud liability.
The Supreme Court's Virginia Bankshares opinion did not
explicitly address the converse issue-namely, whether objective
falsity alone, without subjective falsity, is sufficient to establish
that an opinion is false. However, Justice Scalia, concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, interpreted the Court's opinion as
requiring both subjective and objective falsity:
As I understand the Court's opinion, the statement "In the
opinion of the Directors, this is a high value for the shares"
would produce liability if in fact it was not a high value and
the directors knew that. It would not produce liability if in
fact it was not a high value but the directors honestly
believed otherwise.43
Justice Scalia explained that, because the federal cause of
action at issue "was never enacted by Congress, . . . the more
narrow we make it (within the bounds of rationality) the more
faithful we are to our task."" Indeed, consistent with Justice
Scalia's interpretation, most lower courts having explicitly
addressed this issue interpret Virginia Bankshares as requiring a
42. In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989)
("A projection or statement of belief contains at least three implicit factual
assertions: (1) that the statement is genuinely believed, (2) that there is a
reasonable basis for that belief, and (3) that the speaker is not aware of any
undisclosed facts tending to seriously undermine the accuracy of the statement.
A projection or statement of belief may be actionable to the extent that one of
these implied factual assertions is inaccurate." (emphasis added)); In re XM
Satellite Radio Holdings Sec. Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165, 177 (D.D.C. 2007)
("Under the doctrine established by Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg....
statements of opinion, if they are material, may be actionable if they are not
actually believed when made, if there is no reasonable basis for them, or if the
speaker is aware of undisclosed facts that tend seriously to undermine the
statements' accuracy." (emphasis added)); In re Apollo Grp. Inc. Sec. Litig., 509
F. Supp. 2d 837, 844 (D. Ariz. 2007) (characterizing the test as "disjunctive");
In re Nokia OYJ (Nokia Corp.) Sec. Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 364, 397 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (stating that an opinion may be actionable if it "was without a basis in fact
or the speakers were aware of facts undermining the positive statements"
(emphasis added)); D.E. & J Ltd. P'ship v. Conaway, 284 F. Supp. 2d 719, 741
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (stating that the opinions at issue would be false if issued
"without a genuine belief or reasonable basis").
43. Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1108-09 (Scalia, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 1110 (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 190-92
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Justice Scalia is referring to his disapproval of
implied private rights of action, such as the one that the Supreme Court
recognized for breach of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act in J.L Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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plaintiff to prove both objective and subjective falsity in order to
establish that an opinion is false 45for purposes of securities fraud
liability, albeit with little analysis.
B. The Subjective FalsityRequirement Raises the Applicable
ScienterLevel
The subjective falsity requirement, when applied, effectively
raises the applicable scienter level. Both subjective falsity and
45. E.g., Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d at 110 ("[W]hen a plaintiff
asserts a claim under section 11 or 12 based upon a belief or opinion alleged to
have been communicated by a defendant, liability lies only to the extent that the
statement was both objectively false and disbelieved by the defendant at the time
it was expressed."); Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th
Cir. 2009) ("Because these fairness determinations are alleged to be misleading
opinions, not statements of fact, they can give rise to a claim under section 11
only if the complaint alleges with particularity that the statements were both
objectively and subjectively false or misleading."); Nolte v. Capital One Fin.
Corp., 390 F.3d 311, 315 (4th Cir. 2004) ("In Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg,the Supreme Court held that in a securities fraud case, a statement of
opinion may be a false factual statement if the statement is false, disbelieved by
its maker, and related to matters of fact which can be verified by objective
evidence." (citations omitted)); Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d
657, 670 (5th Cir. 2004) ("A statement of belief is only open to objection where
the evidence shows that the speaker did not in fact hold that belief and the
statement made asserted something false or misleading about the subject
matter." (emphasis added)); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1993)
("[S]tatements which contain the speaker's opinion are actionable under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act if the speaker does not believe the opinion
and the opinion is not factually well-grounded."); United States v. Causey, No.
CRIM. H-05-025-SS, 2005 WL 2647976, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2005)
("Virginia Bankshares and its progeny establish that vague, conclusory
statements are actionable when juxtaposed to allegations that they are false
expressions of a corporate manager's opinion or belief, they are misleading
about their subject matter, and capable of proof by objective evidence of
historical fact."); In re Salomon Analyst AT&T Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 455, 465
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("It is well established that liability under section 10(b) can be
predicated on statements of opinion, where it can be shown not merely that a
proffered opinion was incorrect or doubtful, but that the speaker deliberately
misrepresented his actual opinion."); D.E. & J Ltd. P'ship, 284 F. Supp. 2d at
736 ("Material statements which contain the speaker's opinion are actionable
under Section 10(b) only if the speaker does not believe the opinion and the
opinion is not factually well-grounded."); Bond Opportunity Fund v. Unilab
Corp., No. 99-Civ- 11074, 2003 WL 21058251, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2003)
("Plaintiffs who charge that a statement of opinion, including a fairness opinion,
is materially misleading, must allege 'with particularity' 'provable facts' to
demonstrate that the statement of opinion is both objectively and subjectively
false. Thus, the plaintiff must show both that the directors did not actually hold
the belief or opinion stated, and that the opinion stated was in fact incorrect."
(citation omitted)).
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scienter address the defendant's state of mind when making the
allegedly false statement.46 Judge Gerard E. Lynch in the Southern
District of New York aptly explained the merger of subjective
falsity and scienter into a single analysis as follows:
Although in the typical case falsity and scienter are
different elements, in a false statement of opinion case the
two requirements are essentially identical. For example, in
a case where a material misstatement of fact is alleged, the
statement may be both objectively false and believed in
good faith by the speaker to be true. However, in contrast, a
material misstatement of opinion is by its nature a false
statement, not about the objective world, but about the
defendant's own belief. Adequately alleging the falsity of a
statement like "I believe AWE will grow" is the same as
adequately alleging scienter on the part of the speaker,
since the statement (unlike a statement of fact) cannot be
false at all unless the speaker is knowingly misstating his
truly held opinion.47
This merger has four important impacts on the analysis of
alleged misrepresentations of opinion: (1) The applicable scienter
level for securities fraud is raised from recklessness to actual
knowledge; (2) the subjective falsity pleading standard is
influenced by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's
(PSLRA) strong inference pleading requirement; (3) the PSLRA's
special scienter standard for forward-looking statements is
subsumed into the subjective falsity requirement; and (4) the
subjective falsity requirement adds a "state of mind" element to
securities claims without one.

46. In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 48 (1st Cir. 2005)
("[T]he subjective aspect of the falsity requirement and the scienter requirement
essentially merge; the scienter analysis is subsumed by the analysis of subjective
falsity."); In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630,
639 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (addressing subjective falsity) ("The issue of whether
Moody's believed the opinion will be addressed below in relation to the element
of scienter."); In re DRDGold Ltd. Sec. Litig., 472 F. Supp. 2d 562, 569

(S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("in analyzing whether DRD's statements regarding the
'sustainability' of the NWO and DRD's 'strong balance sheet' were not
sincerely held opinions and thus actionable misrepresentations, the 'material
misrepresentation' requirement for pleading fraud essentially collapses into the
scienter requirement.").
47. In re Salomon Analyst, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 466.

396

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 73

1. The Applicable Scienter Levelfor Statements of Opinion Is
Actual Knowledge
48
Although the Supreme Court has not yet reached this issue,
the courts of appeals agree that the element of scienter with respect
fact is established if the defendant
to alleged misrepresentations of 49
acted intentionally or recklessly.
In contrast, when analyzing whether an opinion is subjectively

false, most courts require more than recklessness to establish
subjective falsity.5 0 As Judge Lynch explained:
It is not sufficient for these purposes to allege that an
irrational, excessively
opinion was unreasonable,

optimistic, not borne out by subsequent events, or any other
characterization that relies on hindsight or falls short of an
identifiable gap between the opinion publicly expressed
and the opinion truly held.5
Other courts have described this subjective falsity requirement in
similar terms: disbelief of the opinion expressed;52 deliberate
48. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323 (2011)
("We have not decided whether recklessness suffices to fulfill the scienter
requirement.").
49. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3
(2007) ("Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a
plaintiff may meet the scienter requirement by showing that the defendant acted
intentionally or recklessly.").
50. See In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 757 F.
Supp. 2d 260, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("Although there is some disagreement
among the district courts in this Circuit as to whether recklessness can satisfy
the subjective falsity requirement, the prevailing conclusion is that a plaintiff
must allege that the defendant did not actually believe the stated opinion."). But
see In re Nat ' Century Fin. Enters., 580 F. Supp. 2d at 639 (after merging the
subjective falsity and scienter analyses, applying the recklessness standard); In
re DRDGold Ltd., 472 F. Supp. 2d at 571-73 (after collapsing the subjective
falsity analysis into the scienter analysis, analyzing whether the plaintiffs'
allegations gave rise to a "strong inference of recklessness"); D.E. & J Ltd.
P'ship, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 740 (applying the "knowledge" or "reckless
disregard" test to determine if an auditor's opinion was made "without a genuine
belief").
51. In re Salomon Analyst, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
52. Broderick v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 169 F. App'x 496, 499 (9th
Cir. 2006) ("There was no materially false or misleading statement: PHP
qualified its remarks with words such as 'believes,' 'Company's .
interpretation' and 'in management's opinion.' Plaintiffs do not allege that the
company did not in fact hold such beliefs at the time that the statement was
made."); In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir. 2005)
("A plaintiff can challenge a statement of opinion by pleading facts sufficient to
indicate that the speaker did not actually hold the opinion expressed (throughout
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misrepresentation of a truly held opinion; 53 knowing misstatement
of a truly held opinion;
knowing falsity;
and actual
knowledge." 6 Regardless of the terminology used, however, this
subjective falsity requirement requires more than mere
recklessness.
Because the subjective falsity requirement is more stringent
than the ordinary scienter requirement, the merger of these two
analyses when the alleged misrepresentation is a statement of
opinion has the effect of raising the applicable scienter level.5 7 In
other words, when the alleged misrepresentation is a statement of
opinion, the applicable scienter level is raised 58from recklessness to
actual disbeliefor actualknowledge of falsity.

this opinion, we refer to such allegations as claims of 'subjective falsity').");
Belmont Holdings Corp. v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-1I85-WSD,
2010 WL 3545389, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2010) ("Absent an allegation that
Defendants did not believe the statements incorporated into the RS/P, Plaintiff
has not stated a claim for misstatements relating to SunTrust's opinion regarding
the adequacy of its loan reserves."); Podany v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 350 F.
Supp. 2d 375, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (dismissing a securities fraud claim
premised on an analyst's "buy" rating where the plaintiff failed to allege
sufficient evidence that "he did not subjectively believe the opinion he was
propounding in his analyst reports").
53. Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co.,
753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 182 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010) ("[A statement of opinion] is
only actionable if 'defendants deliberately misrepresented a truly held opinion."'
(quoting Podany, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 153-54)); Podany, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 15354 ("The sine qua non of a securities fraud claim based on false opinion is that
defendants deliberately misrepresented a truly held opinion.").
54. In re Salomon Analyst, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 466 (explaining that an
opinion "cannot be false at all unless the speaker is knowingly misstating his
truly held opinion").
55. In re Credit Suisse, 431 F.3d at 49 ("The plaintiff must ... point to
provable facts that strongly suggest knowing falsity."); In re Bank ofAm. Corp.,
757 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (analyzing the subjective falsity of opinions by applying
a knowingly false standard).
56. In re Bank of Am. Corp., 757 F. Supp. 2d at 311 ("[The actual
knowledge standard for subjective falsity] comports with the Supreme Court's
view in Virginia Bankshares that statements of belief are statements of fact in
the sense that they convey that the speaker 'do[es] act for the reasons given or
hold the belief stated,' and that such statements may be attacked by
'circumstantial evidence bearing on the facts that would reasonably underlie the
reasons claimed and the honesty of any statement' regarding those reasons."
(quoting Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1092-93 (1991))).
57. Wendy Gerwick Couture, Price Fraud,63 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 64 (2011)
("[T]he falsity and scienter elements converge when an opinion is the basis of a
securities fraud claim, effectively raising the scienter level to knowledge.").
58. See Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, PromissoryFraud,78 N.Y. ST. B.J. 26,
28-29 (2006) (noting a similar convergence between the falsity and scienter
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2. The Strong Inference of Scienter PleadingStandardInforms
Whether Subjective Falsity Is PleadedAdequately
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) impose heightened pleading
standards on claims for securities fraud.59 With respect to the
falsity element, the PSLRA and Rule 9(b) require that falsity be
pleaded with particularity. 60 With respect to the element of
scienter, the PSLRA requires a Vlaintiff to plead facts giving rise to
a "strong inference" of scienter. As the Supreme Court explained,
a "complaint will survive... only if a reasonable person would
deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compellin , as
any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged."
When these heightened pleading standards are applied to
allegedly fraudulent opinions, the pleading standards for falsity
and scienter merge. 63 In other words, the precedent developed in
the context of pleading the strong inference of scienter informs
whether a plaintiff has adequately pleaded the element of
subjective falsity.64 Therefore, a complaint will survive dismissal

elements in the context of promissory fraud) ("Courts reason that a promisor
cannot be mistaken about his or her own intent. Thus if the defendant didn't
intend to perform [thus rendering his implied representation of the intent to
perform false], the misrepresentation must have been a knowing one, and hence
there is no need for separate proof of scienter.").
59. The PSLRA applies "in each private action arising under this chapter
that is brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(l) (2006). Rule 9(b) applies to all civil actions
asserting fraud and filed in federal court. FED. R. Civ. P. 1, 9(b).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l)(B) (2006) ("[T]he complaint shall specify... the
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading."); FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b) ("[A]
party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud .... ).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 2011). By contrast, Rule 9(b) does
not require that the element of scienter be pleaded with particularity: "Malice,
intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged
generally." FED. R. CIrv. P. 9(b).
62. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).
63. E.g., In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative, and ERISA Litig., 757
F. Supp. 2d 260, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("Thus, the PSLRA's requirement that a
plaintiff must plead 'with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind,' applies to the Derivative
Plaintiffs' claim that the BofA Directors' opinion was false or misleading."
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2))); In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431
F.3d 36, 49 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[T]he plaintiff must, for each allegedly false
opinion, plead provable facts strongly suggesting that the speaker did not believe
that particular opinion to be true when uttered.").
64. In re Credit Suisse, 431 F.3d at 48 ("Because subjective falsity is so
intricately tied to scienter in false opinion cases, the authorities relative to
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only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of the
speakers' disbelief in the expressed opinion 65"cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposing inference .... "
Actual Knowledge Requirementfor Forward3. The PSLRA "s
Looking Statements Subsumes the Subjective Falsity
Requirement
The PSLRA affords safe harbor protection to a forwardlooking statement if "the plaintiff fails to prove that [it] ... was
made with actual knowledge ... that the statement was false or
misleading. 66 Like the subjective falsity requirement, the safe
harbor has the effect of raising the applicable scienter level from
recklessness to knowledge.67 The safe harbor protection was
enacted in order to counteract "[t]he muzzling effect of abusive
securities litigation." 68 As the Joint Explanatory Statement of the
Conference Committee explained, "Fear that inaccurate projections
will trigger the filing of securities class action lawsuit[s] has
muzzled corporate management., 69 The safe harbor protection, by
raising the bar for a plaintiff to survive dismissal and to prevail on
the merits, seeks to encourage companies to share
70 predictions with
efficiency.
market
enhancing
thereby
public,
the
Forward-looking statements are quintessential opinions. As
defined in the statute, a forward-looking statement is essentially a
prediction. 71 And indeed, absent a crystal ball, any prediction is
necessarily subjective, requiring the speaker to infer an unknown
fact (i.e., the future) from a known set of facts (i.e., the present).72

pleading scienter are instructive (although not necessarily controlling) when
determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied his or her pleading burden with

respect to the subjective aspect of the falsity claim.").
65. Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 324.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B) (2006).
67. See supra Part III.B. 1.
68. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 42 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741.

69. Id.
at 742.

70. Id.
("The Conference Committee has adopted a statutory 'safe harbor' to
enhance market efficiency by encouraging companies to disclose forwardlooking information.").
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1) (2006). See also Wendy Gerwick Couture,
Mixed Statements: The Safe Harbor's Rocky Shore, 39 SEc. REG. L.J. 257, 260
(2011) ("The common element in this definitional list is the requirement that the
statement refer to afiture,as opposed to a presentorpast, state of affairs.").
72. See infra Part III.E.3.
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Therefore, both the PSLRA safe harbor and the subjective
falsity requirement apply to forward-looking statements. These two
standards are virtually identical. 73 As such, the PSLRA's actual
knowledge requirement effectively subsumes the subjective falsity
requirement for a subset of opinions-namely, predictions.
4. The Subjective FalsityRequirement Adds a Scienter Element
to Securities Claims Without One
The subjective falsity requirement, if applied to securities
claims under §§ 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, injects a
scienter requirement into otherwise strict liability claims. Section
11 imposes strict liability on certain parties, including issuers and
underwriters for false or misleading statements in registration
statements, 74' and § 12(a)(2) imposes strict liability on sellers for
false or misleadinag statements in prospectuses and other offering
communications. 75 Section 11 affords nonissuer defendants a due
diligence defense, 76 and § 12(a)(2) affords defendants a reasonable
care defense 7 -which have the effect of imposing a negligencelike state of mind requirement on defendants.8
Even so, however,
79
plaintiffs are not required to prove scienter.
The subjective falsity requirement, when applied to §§ 11 and
12(a)(2) claims premised on opinions, effectively imports a
scienter element into these claims.6 One commentator has argued
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See supra Part III.B.1.
15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
Id. § 771(a)(2).
Id. § 77k(b).
Id. § 771(a)(2).

78. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 (1976) (characterizing
the § 11 due diligence defense) ("In effect, this is a negligence standard."); In re
Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 1995)

("[S]ection lI's 'reasonable investigation' standard is similar, if not identical, to
section 12(2)'s 'reasonable care' standard.").

79. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1463 (9th ed. 2009) (defining scienter as
"[a] degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the
consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act's having been done
knowingly" or "[a] mental state consisting in an intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud").
80. E.g., Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2011)

("[W]hen a plaintiff asserts a claim under section 11 or 12 based upon a belief or
opinion alleged to have been communicated by a defendant, liability lies only to
the extent that the statement was both objectively false and disbelieved by the
defendant at the time it was expressed."); Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp Ltd., 551
F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Because these fairness determinations are
alleged to be misleading opinions, not statements of fact, they can give rise to a
claim under section 11 only if the complaint alleges with particularity that the
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that the subjective falsity requirement therefore "contravenes
congressional intent to lessen the burdens of proof under the
securities laws, because
it essentially incorporates the equivalent of
81
a scienter burden."
C. Courts Do Not Apply a Uniform Test to DistinguishStatements
of Fact and Statements of Opinion in SecuritiesFraudCases
Despite the necessity of distinguishing between statements of
fact and statements of opinion in order to assess whether the
plaintiff must plead and prove subjective falsity, courts do not
apply a uniform test to make this distinction in securities fraud
cases.
1. The I Know It When I See It Test
First, a number of courts seem to apply an I know it when I see
it test, merely characterizing certain statements as opinions without
articulating a rationale. For example, in Plumbers' Union Local
No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co.,8 2 the court
characterized the statement that "Swiss Re's sub-prime-related
activities outside its invested assets had 'significantly less risk than
the risk that [Swiss Re was] exposed to through the investment that
[it had] made recently in sub-prime bonds"' as a statement of
opinion because "a statement of relative risk is a statement of
opinion." 83 Similarly, in In re DRDGold Ltd Securities
Litigation,84 the court concluded that statements about the
"sustainability" of restructuring and a "'strong balance sheet'
appear to be more properly characterized
as optimistic statements
85
of opinion as opposed to fact."

statements were both objectively and subjectively false or misleading."). But see
Fait,655 F.3d at 112 n.5 ("Contrary to plaintiff's concern, the standard applied
here does not amount to a requirement of scienter. We do not view a
requirement that a plaintiff plausibly allege that defendant misstated his truly
held belief and an allegation that defendant did so with fraudulent intent as one
and the same.").
81. John S. Poole, Improving the Reliability of Management Forecasts, 14
J. CoRp. L. 547, 570 (1989).
82. 753 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
83. Id. at 182 (alterations in original).
84. 472 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
85. Id. at 569.
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2. The Literal Test
Other courts applying a literal test give great weight to
inclusion of phrases like "I think," "I believe," and "in
opinion" when analyzing whether an alleged misrepresentation
statement of opinion or fact, apparently without regard to

the
my
is a
the

substance of the representation following that phrase. 86For
instance, in Broderick v. PriceWaterhouseCoopersLLp,8 7 the court
noted that the defendant "qualified its remarks with words such as
'believes,' 'Company's . .. interpretation' and 'in management's
opinion."" Similarly, in Malin v. XL CapitalLtd.,9 the court used
italics to highlight certain phrases that indicated the statements'
status as opinion:
The language used by Defendants-e.g., XL "believes" the
reserves are sufficient, "we think we've turned a corner
now," "I believe we are in an unencumbered position to
move forward," "we believe, given all the facts we know
today, it is at the right reserve levels," and the Company
"believes the methods presently adopted [for estimating
loss reserves] provide a reasonably objective result"-qualifies the statements and 90indicates their status as
opinions, rather than guarantees.

86. E.g., In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 549, 557
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Typical of the statements challenged by Plaintiffs is Lane's

statement on a conference call with Wall Street analysts following the
announcement of the Company's investment in ImClone Systems that 'we think
that this is a tremendous strategic opportunity. We think [Erbitux] is real
blockbuster potential,has the potential to be one of the most exciting, if not the
most exciting, oncology compound introduced over the next several years...
[a]nd it's a compound with an 18-year patent life, ready to go to market

hopefully next year."' (alterations in original)); D.E. & J Ltd. P'ship v.
Conaway, 284 F. Supp. 2d 719, 736 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ("The full text makes

clear that the statements which Plaintiffs contend are false are statements of
opinion. ('We believe that these financial statements reasonably present our
financial position and results of operations'; 'we maintain comprehensive
systems of internal controls [which] we believe provide . . . reasonable
assurance [that asset [sic] are safeguarded and transactions are executed in
accordance with established procedures].')" (alterations in original)).
87. 169 F. App'x 496 (9th Cir. 2006).

88. Id. at 499.

89. 499 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D.Conn. 2007).
90. Id. at 144 (alteration in original).
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3. The Judgment or Subjectivity Test
Finally, a number of courts engage in a more nuanced analysis,
characterizing opinions as statements that involve judgment or
subjectivity. For example, as the First Circuit explained, most
stock analysts' ratings are statements of opinion because "[a]rmed
with the same background facts, two knowledgeable analysts, each
acting in the utmost good faith, could well assign different ratings
to the same stock." 91 Similarly, a number of courts have juxtaposed
statements of objective or verifiable fact with those of subjective
opinion. 92 According to these courts, statements about the source
of information, 93 the amount of sales in the past quarter,9964 the
firm's market capitalization, 95 an executive's promotion, the
firm's provision of certain types of telephone and Internet
service, 7 and the liquidity of an investment "° are statements of
objective fact. In contrast, statements about the adequacy of
91. In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir. 2005)
("Most ratings are, therefore, best understood as statements of opinion, not as
unadulterated statements of objective fact.").
92. E.g., Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2011)
("[T]he statements regarding goodwill at issue here are subjective ones rather
than 'objective factual matters."').
93. Secs. & Exch. Comm'n v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 240 n.11
(4th Cir. 2009) ("Claims regarding the source of information are not expressions
of subjective opinion, but are representations of an objectively verifiable fact.").
94. In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 248, 251-52
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("'Facts' about a company include data like amount of sales in
a past quarter or the firm's market capitalization on a given date (closing price
of the stock multiplied by number of shares outstanding), or events like an
executive's promotion to CEO or the acquisition of a competitor.").
95. Id.

96. Id.
97. Scritchfield v. Paolo, 274 F. Supp. 2d 163, 183 (D.R.I. 2003) ("The next
subset of alleged fraud essentially concerns one statement that was repeated at
the bottom of various 1999 press releases: '[LOA] is a

. .

. "CLEC" and...

"IISP" providing local dial-tone, instate toll, long distance, high-speed Internet
access and cable programming solutions .

. . ."')

("The statement is a

representation of present and verifiable fact-LOA marketed itself and may
have attracted investors because it represented itself as a company that could
provide and was providing these services. If it could not or was not providing
these services at the time it issued these statements, it may have committed
actionable fraud.").
98. Owens v. Gafiken & Barriger Fund, LLC, No. 08-Civ-8414, 2009 WL
3073338, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2009) ("The alleged misrepresentations
concerning the liquid nature of the investment and the plaintiff's easy access to
cash withdrawal cannot be couched as a matter of opinion or optimism, but
rather, were concrete representations concerning the Fund's purpose and
function.").
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reserves for predicted loan losses 99 and valuation models100 are
statements of subjective opinion. Finally, a number of courts have
cited the exercise of professional judgment-such as that
of an
0
auditor or a ratings agency-as a hallmark of an opinion.' 1
D. The Falsity ofan Opinion Is EstablishedOnly if It Is Both
Objectively and Subjectively False
This Article agrees with the majority of courts having
addressed this issue that, for an opinion to be false, it must be both
subjectively and objectively false, not merely objectively false. 102
First, this dual-falsity requirement recognizes that an opinion,
in addition to conveying something objective, conveys something
subjective-the speaker's mental processes. This "something
special" that opinions convey is recognized in a variety of other
contexts in the law. For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence
recognize that opinions are unique. Rule 701 limits the
admissibility of opinion testimony of lay witnesses to those that are
"helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to
99. Belmont Holdings Corp. v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-1 185,
2010 WL 3545389, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2010) ("Whether SunTrust had
adequate reserves for its predicted loan losses generally is not a matter of
objective fact, but rather a statement of SunTrust's opinion regarding what
portion of its loan portfolio would be uncollectable.").
100. In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 248, 251-52
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("First, the Court rejects plaintiffs' characterization of
valuation models as 'fact' rather than 'opinion.' ... In contrast to these objective
statements, financial valuation models depend so heavily on the discretionary
choices of the modeler-including choice of method (e.g., discounted cash flow
vs. market-based methods), choice of assumptions (such as the proper discount
rate or cost of capital for a particular firm or industry), and choice of
'comparables' that the resulting models and their predictions can only fairly be
characterized a subjective opinions.").
101. In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc. Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630,
639 (S.D. Ohio 2008) ("There is no dispute that, even as described in the
complaint, the ratings that Moody's assigned to the notes ultimately represented
Moody's own judgment or opinion about the quality of the bond."); Payne v.
DeLuca, 433 F. Supp. 2d 547, 580 (W.D. Pa. 2006) ("In allegations based on the
defendant's violation of GAAP, the plaintiff must show 'that the accounting
judgments which were made were such that no reasonable accountant would
have made the same decision if confronted with the same facts."' (quoting In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1426 (9th Cir. 1994))); D.E. & J
Ltd. P'ship v. Conaway, 284 F. Supp. 2d 719, 740 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ("The
opinion rule discussed above is particularly applicable with respect to opinions
by auditors, which generally involve issues such as the auditor's dependence on
information supplied by the client, application of complex accounting and
auditing standards, and varying degrees of professional judgment.").
102. See supra Part III.A.
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determining a fact in issue. ''1 3 This limitation recognizes that
opinion lay testimony has something special to it-which can be
invaluable to a jury, such as when it interprets evidence that the
jury would not otherwise fully understand, and which also can
infringe on the jury's fact-finding function, such as when it is
offered "in lieu of the individual components of perception."' 04 As
another example, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
prohibit attorneys from "knowingly... malking] a false statement
of material fact . . . to a third person,'1 5 and the comments
distinguish between these prohibited factual misstatements and
opinions-like "[e]stimates of price or value placed on the subject
of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable
settlement of
0 6 a claim"--that are not within the scope of the
prohibition.'
Second, this dual falsity requirement recognizes that this
"something special" about opinions enhances market efficiency,
thus meriting the heightened protection that the subjective falsity
requirement affords. The dissemination of opinions about
securities is a valuable way to enhance market efficiency. For
example, the Supreme Court has characterized securities analysis
10 7
as "necessary to the preservation of a healthy market."'
Congress, also recognizing the importance of securities analysis to
capital-raising, recently enacted the JOBS Act, which lifts
restrictions on securities analyst coverage of "emerging growth
compan[ies]."' 08 When enacting the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress
similarly recognized that credit rating agencies, which play a
gatekeeper role similar to that of securities analysts, are "central to
103. FED. R. EviD. 701.
104. 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6255 (1997).
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2010).
106. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (2010).
107. Dirks v. Secs. & Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983); id. at 657
n.17 (quoting the SEC's briefing) ("The SEC expressly recognized that '[t]he
value to the entire market of [analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market
efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out
and analyze information, and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of
all investors."' (alterations in original)).
108. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (The JOBS Act) § 105(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78o-6(c) (Westlaw 2012) (prohibiting certain restrictions on
communications between securities analysts and potential investors and on
communications among analysts, company management, and investment
banking personnel); H.R. REP. No. 112-406, at 6 (2012), reprinted in 2012
U.S.C.C.A.N. 278, 279 ("H.R. 3606 also improves the flow of information about
EGCs [Emerging Growth Companies] to investors by removing burdensome and
outdated restrictions on communications between companies, research analysts,
and investors.").

406

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 73

capital formation, investor confidence, and the efficient
performance of the United States economy."' 0 9 Finally, the unique
insights of companies and their officers and directors are essential
to market efficiency. Indeed, when enacting the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, Congress explicitly recognized the
importance of a company's expression of its opinions about the
future of its business in achieving market efficiency." 0 Yet, if an
honestly expressed opinion were potentially actionable merely
because, after the fact, it were deemed unreasonable, voluntary
expression of opinions would be stifled. Thus, just as the PSLRA
affords safe harbor protection to forward-looking statements in
order to encourage companies to share their opinions about the
future,"' the subjective falsity requirement lessens the selfcensorship of these valuable communications.
Indeed, the contention that opinions should be treated specially
in the context of securities fraud draws on the work of numerous
eminent scholars who, recognizing that courts struggle mightily
when applying the elements of securities fraud to statements other
than "plain vanilla" statements of fact, have identified various
subsets of statements and proposed analytical frameworks that
should apply to those subsets. None of these scholars has focused
specifically on statements of opinion. Yet, a close analysis of their
proposed subsets shows that they intersect around statements of
opinion. For example, Professor Jennifer O'Hare, noting courts'
inconsistent application of the puffery defense to (1) vague forwardlooking statements and (2) vague statements characterizing present
facts, has proposed a framework to analyze the materiality of these
statements." Professor Donald C. Langevoort has identified courts'
inconsistent treatment of half-truths and proposed a framework for
assessing whether half-truths should be actionable as securities
fraud."11Professor David A. Hoffman has proposed a new presumed
liability regime to apply to so-called puffery, which he identifies in

109. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.

No. 111-203, § 931(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
110. H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369, at 43 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.

730, 742 ("The Conference Committee has adopted a statutory 'safe harbor' to
enhance market efficiency by encouraging companies to disclose forwardlooking information.").

111. Id. at 731 ("And it establishes a safe harbor for forward looking
statements, to encourage issuers to disseminate relevant information to the
market without fear of open-ended liability.").
112. O'Hare, supra note 12, at 1709, 1737.
113. Langevoort, supra note 13, at 88, 113.
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the securities context as "vague statement[s] of14 corporate
optimism" about the future or about current conditions.'
Therefore, this Article contends that the "specialness" of
opinions should be reflected in the dual-falsity requirement, which
mandates that an opinion is not false unless both objectively and
subjectively so. In other words, the special part of an opinion-the
speaker's mental processes-must be misrepresented in order for
an opinion to be false. Of course, this Article's recommendation
presupposes that one can identify that subset of statementsnamely, opinions-that merit this "special" treatment. Indeed, as
discussed below, the dual falsity implication of being classified as
an opinion should help guide the creation of the standard to
identify statements of opinion.
E. Courts Should Apply the Novel Evaluation-Inference Test to
Identify Statements of Opinion
The issue of whether an opinion must be objectively and
subjectively false is interrelated with the issue of how to identify
an opinion. Underlying the dual-falsity requirement is the
recognition that opinions have "something special" about themthe mental processes of the speaker. The key to identifying
statements of opinion is identifying what exactly is special about
them. To place a finger on this specialness, this Part first draws
guidance from the same quandary in the contexts of defamation
and common law fraud. Then, this Part proposes that an opinion
for purposes of securities fraud is a statement requiring evaluation
or inference. In particular, this Part proposes the following
evaluation-inference test to differentiate statements of fact from
statements of opinion for securities fraud purposes: Does the
statement express the speaker's evaluation or inference of facts?
Finally, this Part explains how this test dovetails with the dualfalsity requirement and compares this test to the current tests that
courts apply in the contexts of defamation, common law fraud, and
securities fraud.
1. The Fact-OpinionDistinctionin the Defamation Context
The fact-opinion distinction was once paramount in the law of
defamation, with courts and commentators interpreting Supreme
Court precedent as holding that statements of opinion may not be

114. Hoffinan, supra note 14, at 1405-11, 1445.
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actionable because they are protected by the First Amendment. 115
however, the Supreme
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
Court rejected the contention that the fact-opinion distinction is
determinative of First Amendment protection: "[W]e think the
'breathing space' which '[flreedoms of expression require in order
to survive' is adequately secured by existing constitutional doctrine
without the creation of an artificial dichotomy between 'opinion'
and fact. ' 117 Although the fact-opinion distinction is no longer
outcome determinative in defamation cases, the scholarship that
developed around this issue is nonetheless instructive when
analyzing this issue in the securities fraud context.
One of the most influential scholars in this area, Dean W. Page
Keeton, divided opinions into two categories--evaluative and
deductive. 11 8 Subsequent scholars have adopted these categories
when discussing the scope of common law defamation and the
scope of First Amendment protection of opinions.' 19 In an
evaluative opinion, "the speaker makes a normative judgment
based on facts known" to the speaker. 120 In a deductive opinion,
the speaker applies his or her "deductive skills" to a body of facts,
thereby "lead[ing] to the inference of a new fact."' 2 1 By
115. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("We
begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment there is no such
thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition
of other ideas.").
116. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
117. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19 (quoting Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986)).
118. W. Page Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEX. L.
REV. 1221, 1233 (1976) ("A deductive opinion could be characterized as an
imputation of past misconduct or purportedly existing fact, drawn as an
inference from the existence of other facts. By contrast, an evaluative opinion is
simply a condemnation of the defendant for having committed certain
conduct."); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §113A
(5th ed. 1984). Dean Keeton made the additional distinction between opinions
that do not imply any facts and those that do. Id. This distinction is not
instructive on the fact-opinion issue, but it is instructive on the materiality issue
addressed below in Part IV.C.5 and is addressed further there.
119. Joseph H. King, Defamation Claims Based on Parody and Other
Fanciful Communications Not Intended to Be UnderstoodAs Fact, 2008 UTAH
L. REv. 875, 901-02 (2008); Kathryn Dix Sowle, A Matter of Opinion:
Milkovich Four Years Later, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 467, 473-75 (1994);
Ronald K. Chen, Once More into the Breach: Fact Versus Opinion Revisited
After Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 1 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 331, 334-37
(1991).
120. Chen, supranote 119, at 334-35.
121. Id. at 335. Notably, Dean Keeton's usage of the term deductive opinion,
which is premised on inferring an unknown fact from known facts, differs from
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implication, Dean Keeton's categories limit the scope of
statements that are as classified as opinions to those that involve
either evaluation or inference.
2. The Fact-OpinionDistinctionin the Common-Law Fraud
Context
In the common law fraud context, as articulated in the Second
Restatement of Torts, opinions are defined quite broadly: "A
representation is one of opinion if it expresses only (a) the belief of
the maker, without certainty, as to the existence of a fact; or (b) his
judgment as to quality, value, authenticity, or other matters of
judgment. 122 The Restatement definition has been widely cited by
statements of fact and of
courts struggling to differentiate between
123
opinion in misrepresentation cases.
Part (b) of the Restatement definition bears a close resemblance
to Dean Keeton's evaluative opinion classification. The
Restatement cites the statement that "an automobile is a good car"
as an example because "it is a matter upon which individual
judgments may be expected to differ."' 24 Like Dean Keeton's
evaluative opinion classification, the description of an automobile
as "good" is an evaluation drawn from facts known to the speaker.
Part (a) of the Restatement test also bears a close resemblance
to Dean Keeton's deductive opinion classification. Like Dean
Keeton's classification, Part (a) includes a speaker's inferences
about the existence of facts, drawn from the speaker's analysis of
facts known to the speaker.
In one key area, however, Part (a) of the Restatement definition
sweeps more broadly than Dean Keeton's deductive opinion
classification. Part (a) includes qualified statements of fact, even if
the speaker is not inferring the stated facts. Take as an example a
forgetful speaker who, unable to remember the acreage of a parcel
of land, states, "I believe that there are ten acres here." This

the social science definition of deductive reasoning, which is premised on
determining a valid conclusion from true premises. See P. N. Johnson-Laird,
Deductive Reasoning, 50 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 109, 110 (1999) ("By definition,
deduction yields valid conclusions, which must be true given that their premises
are true .... ).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538A (1977).
123. E.g., Marino v. United Bank of Il., N.A., 484 N.E.2d 935, 937 (Ill. App.
1985); McEneaney v. Chestnut Hill Realty Corp., 650 N.E.2d 93, 96 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1995); Consol. Papers, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 451 N.W.2d 456, 459
(Wisc. Ct. App. 1989).

124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538A cmt. b (1977).
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statement, which expresses the speaker's belief, without certainty,
about the existence of fact would fall squarely within Part (a) of
the definition.125 Yet, this qualified statement of fact, which
represents neither the speaker's evaluation nor inference, would
fall outside the scope of Dean Keeton's classifications.
3. In the Context of Securities Fraud,an OpinionRequires the
Exercise of Evaluationor Inference
Drawing from these comparable distinctions in the contexts of
defamation and common law fraud, this Article argues that, for
purposes of securities fraud, opinions should be defined as
statements requiring the speaker's evaluation or inference. A
statement of evaluation expresses the speaker's judgment as to
quality, value, or other matters of judgment. As an example, a
CEO's statement that "our high-tech division is uniquely
positioned to take over the market share abandoned by X
company" would qualify as an opinion because the CEO exercised
independent judgment in order to evaluate the division's position.
A statement of inference expresses the speaker's inference about
the existence of a fact, based on the speaker's analysis of other
data. As an example, a CEO's statement, "I think that our
competitors are expending fewer resources than we are on research
and development," would qualify as an opinion, assuming that the
competitors' R&D budgets were not public, because the CEO
inferred the statement's substance.
a. The Importance of the Opinion Characterization
This test identifies the "something special" that makes applying
the elements of securities fraud to statements of opinion so tricky.
As discussed above, several prominent scholars have identified
various subsets of statements and proposed analytical frameworks
that should apply to those subsets. 2 6 None of those scholars has
focused specifically on statements of opinion, yet statements of
evaluation or inference are at the heart of these scholars' subsets.
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538A cmt. c (1977) ("The form of
the statement is important and may be controlling. 'I believe that there are ten
acres here,' is a different statement, in what it conveys, from 'The area of this
land is ten acres.' The one conveys an expression of some doubt while the other
leaves no room for it."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538A cmt. b
(1977) ("The difference is one between 'This is true,' and 'I think this is true,
but I am not sure."').
126. See supra Part III.D.
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Professor O'Hare's forward-looking 8 statements,1 27 Professor
Langevoort's predictive "half-truths," 2 and Professor Hoffman's
vague statements of corporate optimism about the future-all of
which necessarily require the speaker to infer an unknown fact (the
future) from known facts-are quintessential opinions. Similarly,
Professor O'Hare's "vague statements characterizing present facts"
and Professor Hoffman's vague statements of corporate oRtimism
about the present include evaluative statements of opinion.
b. Comparisonto Tests CurrentlyApplied in SecuritiesFraud
Cases
This evaluation-inference test is preferable to the I know it
when I see it approach that some courts apply because it is capable
of repetition. A uniform and predictable test is imperative so that
corporate actors are not afraid to speak, lest they inadvertently
subject themselves to liability.
Moreover, this evaluation-inference test is better than merely
relying on phrases like "I think" and "in my opinion" because it
elevates substance over form. For example, under the proposed
test, both of the following two statements would be treated as
opinions: (1) "I believe that the company is well-poised to capture
the additional market share vacated by Borders"; and (2) "the
company is well-poised to capture the additional market share
vacated by Borders." The assessment about the company's ability
to capture additional market share incorporates the speaker's
judgment, regardless of whether it is preceded by the phrase "I
believe." The phrase "I believe" is merely implied in the second

127. See O'Hare, supra note 12, at 1709 (citing In re Storage Tech. Corp.
Sec. Litig., 804 F. Supp. 1368, 1372 (D. Colo. 1992)) (referencing a company's
prediction that a product would be a "blowout winner" as an example of a
vague, forward-looking statement). Because it was uncertain whether the
product would indeed be a success, the company's prediction, drawn from
known facts about the product, constituted a deductive opinion.
128. See Langevoort, supra note 13, at 116 (citing a company's release of a
projection, without also disclosing that that the company is also considering

more pessimistic projections internally, as an example of a half-truth).

129. See O'Hare, supra note 12, at 1713 n.95 (citing Searls v. Glasser, 64

F.3d 1061, 1066 (7th Cir. 1995)) (referencing a company's statement that it was
"recession-resistant" as an example of a "vague statement [] of present facts").
This statement, which expresses a company's subjective evaluation drawn from
known facts about the company, is an evaluative opinion. See also Hoffman,
supra note 14, at 1410 n.84-85 (citing examples of puffing statements about
current conditions).
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statement. 130 The converse is also true. Neither of the following
two statements, made by the chairman of the board of directors,
would be treated as an opinion: (1) "The board met for three hours
before voting on the merger"; and (2) "I believe that the board met
for three hours before voting on the merger." The mere addition of
the qualifying phrase "I believe" would not transform a statement
of fact, which was neither inferred nor evaluative, into a statement
of opinion.
Further, the evaluation-inference test is consistent with the
more nuanced analyses applied by courts such as the First Circuit
13f
which requires that opinions involve judgment or subjectivity.
Like those courts, the evaluation-inferencetest recognizes that the
special treatment afforded opinions-including specialized falsity
and materiality analyses-is only appropriate if the statement is
special. The speaker's independent evaluation or inference is the
added value. In other words, the speaker's evaluation or inference
might differ from another's, even if the other were presented with
the same background facts from which to reach an evaluation or an
inference, and it is 32that "something special" that makes the
statement an opinion.

Applying the evaluation-inferencetest to those statements that
courts have classified as opinions in securities cases demonstrates
that most statements that courts have classified as opinions are
within the scope of the evaluation-inference test, despite the
disparate tests that courts have applied. For instance, the following
examples drawn from case law are within the evaluation test's
scope: "Swiss Re's sub-prime-related activities outside its invested
assets had 'significantly less risk than the risk that [Swiss Re was]
exposed to through the investment that [it had] made recently in
sub-prime bonds"'; 133 statements about the "sustainabilit " of
restructuring; 34 statements about a "strong balance sheet";l 'we
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. d (1977) ("Indeed,
every assertion of the existence of a thing is a representation of the speaker's
state of mind, namely, his belief in its existence.").
131. In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir. 2005)
("Most ratings are, therefore, best understood as statements of opinion, not as
unadulterated statements of objective fact.").
132. Id. ("Armed with the same background facts, two knowledgeable
analysts, each acting in the utmost good faith, could well assign different ratings
to the same stock."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538A cmt. b (1977)
("One common form of opinion is a statement of the maker's judgment ... as to
which opinions may be expected to differ.").
133. Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co.,
753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (alterations in original).
134. In re DRDGold Ltd. Sec. Litig., 472 F. Supp. 2d 562, 569 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
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believe, Iven all the facts we know today, it is at the right reserve
levels,"' statements about the adequacy of reserves for predicted
loan losses; 137 and a credit rating. 38 Each of these examples
represents the speaker's evaluation of known facts to reach an
evaluative opinion. Moreover, forward-looking statements, which
are quintessential opinions, are statements of inference drawn from
known facts.
c. Comparison to Tests Applied in the Contexts of Defamation
and Common Law Fraud
The evaluation prong of the proposed test is consistent with
Dean Keeton's classification of evaluative opinions and with prong
(b) of the Restatement's common law fraud test. The inference
prong of the proposed test is consistent with Dean Keeton's
classification of deductive opinions and, like Dean Keeton's
classification, is narrower than prong (a) of the common law fraud
test.
In particular, the evaluation-inference test proposed in this
Article is narrower than the common law fraud test because it
excludes mere qualified statements of fact from the definition of
opinion. For example, if a company's CEO were to state, "I believe
that we started that product line in 2002," this would not qualify as
an opinion for purposes of securities fraud because the statement's
substance is knowable to the speaker. This statement expresses
neither the CEO's judgment nor the speaker's inference. Rather,
this statement more closely resembles a qualified statement of fact.
This category of statement is excluded from the proposed
definition of opinion for two reasons. First, the inclusion of a
qualification does not have independent value to merit the
heightened requirements associated with statements of opinion.
Rather than exercising judgment or making an inference, the CEO
is merely qualifying the statement to express uncertainty. This
qualification does not have independent value that transforms a
statement of fact about the year that the product line was launched
into a statement of opinion.

135. Id.
136. Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., 499 F. Supp. 2d 117, 144 (D. Conn. 2007).
137. Belmont Holdings Corp. v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-1185,
2010 WL 3545389, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2010).
138. In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters. Inc. Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630,
639 (S.D. Ohio 2008).
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Second, the inclusion of a statement of belief about a fact that
is known to the speaker is the mere expression of a statement
implicit in every factual representation. Every statement of fact is
accompanied by the implicit representation that the speaker
believes that the statement is accurate.' 39 Thus, the explicit
inclusion of the phrase "I think" should not magically transform a
statement of fact into an opinion with the concomitant subjective
falsity requirement. For example, a CEO stating, "We started the
product line in 2002," would contain the implicit representation
that the CEO believed this fact to be true. The mere verbalization
of an implicit statement should not operate to transform a
statement of fact into a statement of opinion.
The qualification is not thereby meaningless, however. If the
qualification were sufficient to render it unreasonable for an
investor to rely on the accompanyip, statement of fact, the element
of materiality would not be met.' As an example, if the CEO
were to make the following qualified assertion of fact, it would
likely be immaterial as a matter of law: "I don't have the data in
front of me and my memory is shaky, but I believe we started the
product line in 2002." The inclusion of a qualification does not,
however, transform this statement into an opinion.
IV. WHEN ISAN OPINION MATERIAL?

As this Article has argued so far, an opinion is defined as a
statement expressing the speaker's evaluation or inference of
facts,141 and an opinion is only false if the speaker both objectively
unreasonably and subjectively disbelieved it.' 42 A final complexity
remains when applying the elements of securities fraud to
statements of opinion: When is a statement of opinion "material"?
Courts routinely divide statements of opinion in two groups: (1)
those that are immaterial as a matter of law; and (2) those that are
potentially material. Despite the fact that this division is often
outcome determinative, courts fail to apply a uniform, analytically
sound test to differentiate between these two types of opinions.

139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. d (1977) ("Indeed,
every assertion of the existence of a thing is a representation of the speaker's
state of mind, namely, his belief in its existence.").
140. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (defining
materiality as "a substantial likelihood that the ... fact would have been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information made available" (citation omitted)).
141.

See supra Part III.E.

142. See supra Part III.D.
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Part A of this section demonstrates that courts routinely
dismiss statements of opinion as immaterial as a matter of law, yet
Part B shows that courts fail to apply analytically sound tests when
deciding which statements to categorize as immaterial. To solve
the analytical problems underlying the tests that courts currently
apply, Part C proposes the following reasonableimplication test in
order to identify those opinions that are potentially material: Does
the opinion reasonably imply an allegedly false, material fact?
Further, Part C demonstrates that the reasonableimplication test is
informed by and consistent with comparable tests applied in the
contexts of defamation and common law fraud.
A. Courts DistinguishBetween Opinions That Are ImmaterialAs a
Matter of Law and Those That Are PotentiallyActionable
An alleged misrepresentation is material for purposes of
securities fraud if there is "a substantial likelihood that the.., fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available." r4 Stated differently, a statement is material if "there is
a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important" in deciding how to invest.44
The objective materiality standard for securities fraud balances
the fundamental importance of fair and honest markets against the
dangers of setting the materiality standard too low.145 On one hand,
as the Supreme Court has recognized, "[t]here cannot be honest
markets without honest publicity."' 46 This consideration weighs in
143. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (citation omitted).
144. Id, at 231 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976)).
145. See Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime's Gray Area: The
Anomaly of Criminalizing Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1,
28-29 (2009) (explaining this delicate balance); see also Hoffman, supra note
14, at 1398 (characterizing the puffery doctrine as "walking the line between
overdeterrence of speech and underdeterrence of fraud"). As noted by Professor
Margaret V. Sachs, the objective materiality standard also achieves a related
delicate balance between encouraging and discouraging investor class actions by
simultaneously enabling and limiting them. Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and
Social Change: The Casefor Replacing "The Reasonable Investor" with "The
Least SophisticatedInvestor" in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473, 48689 (2006). On one hand, the objective standard permits a class-wide
determination of materiality. Id. On the other hand, the materiality standard
limits strike suits by barring claims premised on alleged misrepresentations upon
which only an unreasonable investor would have relied. Id.
146. Basic, 485 U.S. at 230 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934)).
See also 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (stating that one purpose of
securities regulation is "to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets");
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favor of a lower materiality standard-both to lower the bar for
required disclosures and to deter affirmative false statements. On
the other hand, an unduly low standard carries its own dangers.
When applied to a company's omissions, "a minimal standard

might bring an overabundance of information within its reach, and
lead management 'simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche

of trivial information-a result that is hardly conducive to

informed decisionmaking." ' 147 Moreover, when applied to
affirmative misrepresentations, the materiality standard prevents
"every miniscule inaccuracy in public statements of SEC filings"
from being actionable, thus encouraging companies to speak

voluntarily without fear of inadvertently incurring liability. 48
Although the materiality element is a question of fact, courts

routinely dismiss statements of opinion because they are
immaterial as a matter of law, 149 often characterizing these
statements as "mere puffery."' 50 Although the term puffery is
Basic, 485 U.S. at 230 (recognizing that a central purpose of the securities laws
is "to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices"); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (stating that the purpose of the securities
law is "to provide investors with full disclosure of material information
concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors
against fraud and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing").
147. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448-49).
148. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §
12.9[3][B] (6th ed. 2011).
149.

See David A. Hoffman, The "Duty" to Be a Rational Shareholder, 90

MINN.

L. REv. 537, 585-86 (2006) (reporting the results of an empirical study)

("Over time . . .courts have become more willing to apply 'puffery' and

'bespeaks caution' doctrines which are (1) bright-line rules that focus on the
language of disclosures, (2) associated with each other, and (3) more likely to
appear at early staged in litigation."); Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati,
How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly):
Rules of Thumb in SecuritiesFraudOpinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 86, 119 (2002)

("In a large number of cases applying the puffery doctrine, this materiality
determination is made at the motion to dismiss stage.").
150. Woodward v. Raymond James Fin., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 425, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[S]tatements of puffery or mere generalizations are not
material misstatements. A reasonable investor, by definition, does not rely upon
general and vague statements of puffery."); In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702
F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1229 (S.D. Cal. 2010) ("Courts often analyze the materiality
of such statements because no reasonable investor would rely on a company's
subjective expression of optimism for the future."); In re Guidant Corp. Sec.
Litig., 536 F. Supp. 2d 913, 928 (S.D. Ind. 2008) ("We note also that several of
the statements disputed by Plaintiffs can be understood as immaterial, nonactionable corporate puffery."); Payne v. DeLuca, 433 F. Supp. 2d 547, 561
(W.D. Pa. 2006) ("Puffery comes into play when a court is considering the
materiality of statements alleged to have been misleading. While materiality
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technically inapposite in most securities fraud cases,' 5 ' this puffery
characterization has essentially become synonymous with
immateriality. A few courts have instead tied the puffery
characterization with the falsity element, stating that puffery is
incapable of falsity. 5 2 This minority characterization is best
interpreted as identifying a subset of puffery: Surely, any statement
that is incapable of falsity is also immaterial because no reasonable
investor would rely on such a statement when making an
investment decision.
Many scholars have criticized courts' failure to consider a
statement's context when dismissing it as mere puffery. 5 4 As
Professor Stefan J. Padfield has noted, this practice conflicts with
the Supreme Court's mandate to assess a statement's materiality in

determinations are typically reserved for the trier of fact, 'complaints alleging
securities fraud often contain claims of omissions or misstatements that are
obviously so unimportant that courts can rule them immaterial as a matter of law
at the pleading stage."' (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903
F.2d 186, 200-01 (3d Cir. 1990) ("To say that a statement is mere 'puffing' is,
in essence, to say that it is immaterial .

. . .");

United States v. Causey, No.

CRIM. H-05-025-SS, 2005 WL 2647976, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2005)
("Puffing is not actionable because it is immaterial.").
151. O'Hare, supra note 12, at 1703-22 (arguing that the "puffery" defense
is inapposite in securities fraud cases premised on a company's statements to
investors because, unlike the assumptions underlying the caveat emptor doctrine
(which is the theoretical underpinning of the puffery defense), the company has
greater access to information and the investors have a reason to trust the
company).
152. In re Nokia OYJ (Nokia Corp.) Sec. Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 364, 400
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("These are exactly the kind of hopeful statements, tinged with
caution, that cannot reasonably be found to be misleading and therefore relied
upon to allege violations of the securities laws."); In re Cable & Wireless, PLC,
Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 767 (E.D. Va. 2004) ("The Fourth Circuit has
also held that soft, puffing business communications and statements, like those
profiled above, do not demonstrate falsity." (citing Howard v. Haddad, 962 F.2d
328, 331 (4th Cir. 1992))); In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 768
("All of the statements Plaintiffs attribute to Defendants as violations of the
securities laws are 'soft' and 'puffery' as defined in cases such as Howard, and
thus do not demonstrate falsity.")."
153. Accord In re Trex Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., 454 F. Supp. 2d 560, 572 (W.D.
Va. 2006) ("For a statement to be material, it must be demonstrably false.").
154. E.g., Stefan J. Padfield, Immaterial Lies: Condoning Deceit in the Name

of Securities Regulation, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143, 171 (2010); O'Hare,
supranote 12, at 1737 ("[C]ourt[s] should not simply review the language of the
statement, label the statement as puffery, and dismiss the action as a matter of
law.").
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light of its effect on "the total mix of information."',5 5 Somewhat
cynically, Professors Stephen M. Bainbridge and G. Mitu Gulati
have explained this tension as result-oriented:
[F]or the most part, context seems to matter only when the
outcome is dismissal. If putting the statement into context
lends credence to a decision to dismiss, the bespeaks
caution doctrine is invoked. If taking a statement out of
context makes dismissal more plausible, however, puffery
is invoked. It is this disparity of treatment, coupled with the
superficiality
5 6 of analysis, which suggests the presence of a
heuristic.
Courts have also struggled with the juxtaposition of the
Virginia Bankshares holding that statements of opinion can be
actionable as false statements of fact because they make implicit
representations 57 and the routine practice of dismissing statements
of opinion as mere puffery. Many courts have characterized
Virginia Bankshares' holding as a limitation or exception to the
general rule that puffery is not actionable' 58 For example, in In re
155. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. at 231-32 (1988) (citation omitted)
(stating the "total mix" standard); Padfield, supra note 154, at 171 ("Courts
generally ignore context when applying the puffery doctrine, contrary to the
'total mix' aspect of the definition of materiality.").
156. Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 149, at 123.
157. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1092 (1991).
158. In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1231 (S.D. Cal.
2010) ("Like his predictions in September 2003, Ragland's December
statements are optimistic statements that usually are not actionable as securities
fraud. Plaintiffs rely on the exception to that general rule. They argue that
Ragland knew his positive, public statements were inaccurate at the time he
made them." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); In re DRDGold Ltd. Sec.
Litig., 472 F. Supp. 2d 562, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (rejecting the defendants'
argument that the alleged misstatements were inactionable "statements of
opinion and puffery" because "opinion statements are actionable if Plaintiffs can
plead 'with particularity that defendants did not sincerely believe the opinion
they purported to hold' (quoting Podany v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 318 F.
Supp. 2d 146, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2004))); In re Dura Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 452 F.
Supp. 2d 1005, 1033 (S.D. Cal. 2006) ("This ['mere puffery'] rule has its
limitations; a projection of optimism becomes actionable 'when (1) the
statement is not actually believed, (2) there is no reasonable basis for the belief,
or (3) the speaker is aware of undisclosed facts tending seriously to undermine
the statement's accuracy."' (citations omitted)); Lapin v. Goldman Sachs Grp.,
Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 221, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("The important limitation on
these principles is that optimistic statements may be actionable upon a showing
that the defendants did not genuinely or reasonably believe the positive opinions
they touted (i.e., the opinion was without a basis in fact or the speakers were
aware of facts undermining the positive statements), or that the opinions imply
certainty."); Fisher v. Kansas, 467 F. Supp. 2d 275, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)

2013]

OPINIONS ACTIONABLE

419

Citigroup Inc. Securities Litigation, the court stated that puffery
could be actionable if it were objectively and subjectively false:
These [statements] are

expressions of "puffery and

corporate optimism" that "do not give rise to securities
violations." Such statements of optimism or predictions
about future performance are actionable only "if they are
worded as guarantees or are supported by specific
statements of fact, or if the
' 59 speaker does not genuinely or
reasonably believe them."'
Other courts have skirted the issue, dismissing securities fraud
claims based on opinions both because the objective-subjective
falsity element 60
is not satisfied and because they are immaterial as a
matter of law. 1
Contrary to the reasoning of these courts, the analytically
sound way to rationalize the Virginia Bankshares holding that
(immediately after determining that the alleged misrepresentations were
"inactionable puffery," suggesting that they would potentially be actionable if
they were objectively and subjectively false); City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v.
Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 669-70 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Thus, federal courts
'everywhere "have demonstrated a willingness to find immaterial as a matter of
law certain kinds of rosy affirmation heard from corporate managers and
numbingly familiar to the marketplace-loosely optimistic statements that are so
vague, [and] so lacking in specificity,... that no reasonable investor could find
them important to the total mix of information available."' However, opinions
may be deemed false or misleading under the securities laws if proof of their
falsity can be established 'through the orthodox evidentiary process."' (citations
omitted)).
159. In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206, 248 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (citations omitted).
160. Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., 499 F. Supp. 2d 117, 145 (D. Conn. 2007)
("There is no showing that O'Hara believed these statements to be false when
made, as set out in more detail in the next section. Moreover, these statements
are generally not actionable as a general statement of optimism."); In re Apple
Computer, Inc., 127 F. App'x 296, 304 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[P]laintiffs do not
allege any factual statement that was false .... [T]hat the new Power Mac was
quite possibly the 'best Power Mac ever' is an opinion, plausibly held. Further,
when valuing a corporation, investors do not rely on such vague statements of
optimism." (citations omitted)); In re No. Nine Visual Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig.,
51 F. Supp. 2d 1, 29-30 (D. Mass. 1999) ("Thus, the statements regarding
expected sales growth in the fourth quarter are not actionable.... Soft, puffing
statements such as these generally lack materiality because the market price of a
share is not inflated by vague statements predicting growth. The Class contends
that such statements can be actionable when accompanied by facts known by
[the defendant], and contemporaneous with the [challenged statements], that
would show that [the defendant's] anticipated success was unlikely. That may be
true, but the Class has not alleged any such facts .... " (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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opinions can be actionable as false statements of fact with the
puffery doctrine is to recognize that they address different
elements of a securities fraud claim-with the former addressing
the misrepresentationoffact element and the latter addressing the
materiality element. The court in In re XM Satellite Radio
Holdings Securities Litigation accurately explained this
relationship:
Plaintiffs argue that under Virginia Bankshares, statements
such as these that "reflect the [d]efendants' opinions or
'subjective assessment"' are actionable if they lack "a
factual basis that justifies them as accurate, the absence of
which renders them misleading." However, such statements
of opinion may only be16actionable under § 12(b) if they are
materially misleading. 1
Stated otherwise, under Virginia Bankshares, a statement of
opinion can qualify as a false statement of fact, thus satisfying the
misrepresentation of fact element. Of course, this is only one
element of a securities fraud claim. The misrepresentation of fact
must also be material.The puffery doctrine relates to whetheK the
materiality element is satisfied. Therefore, the courts that
characterize VirginiaBankshares as a limitation or exception to the
puffery doctrine are, in effect, characterizing apples as an
exception to oranges. Instead, courts should recognize that, under
Virginia Bankshares, a statement of opinion can qualify as a
"misrepresentation of fact." Then, if this element is satisfied (as
well as the other elements), courts should analyze whether that
62
misrepresentation of fact is mere puffery or potentially material.
B. Courts Failto Apply Analytically Sound Tests to Identify
Statements of Opinion That Are ImmaterialAs a Matter of Law
Courts apply various tests, many of which are analytically
unsound, to identify statements of opinion that are immaterial
161. In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Sec. Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165, 182
n.13 (D.D.C. 2007) (alterations in original) (citations omitted); id. at 177
("Under the doctrine established by Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg . . .
statements of opinion, if they are material, may be actionable if they are not
actually believed when made, if there is no reasonable basis for them, or if the
speaker is aware of undisclosed facts that tend seriously to undermine the
statements' accuracy." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
162. E.g., In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 53 (1st Cir.
2005) ("Because the plaintiffs have failed to meet these PSLRA pleading
requirements in regard to subjective falsity and scienter, we need not address
other issues, such as... the materiality of the allegedly false statements .... ").
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puffery, resulting in conflicting and confusing precedent. As the
court aptly stated in Scritchfield v. Paolo, "[T]he line of
demarcation between puffery and actionable misstatement is often
less than pellucid.' 6 Indeed, Professors Bainbridge and Gulati
have criticized the puffery doctrine as a prime example of a
substantive law heuristic that judges apply because of their lack of
experience in securities law, overreliance
on law clerks, and desire
1 64
to move cases off of their dockets.
For example, applying various puffery tests, courts have held
that the following opinions are immaterial as a matter of law:
There is a "high likelihood" that a merger will close 165 we have an
"expectation of continued strong market growth";16 6 production of
a product "seems to be getting fairly close to fruition";167 a product
is "quality" or "best"; 168 marketing expenditures are "cost
effective," "sound," "smart," and "efficient";' 69 the new Power
Mac is quite possibly the "best Power Mac ever"; 170 the company
and its licensees have made "remarkable progress toward
commercialization of our MRAM intellectual property"; 171 the
acquisition created "a premier financial services fianchise with
significantly enhanced wealth management, investment banking
and international capabilities"; 172 a newly combined firm is
"uniquely positioned to win market share";1 7 the inventory system
is "dynamic"; 174 the project is "moving forward quite
smoothly"; 75 there is "tremendous market interest" in the XT3

163. Scritchfield v. Paolo, 274 F. Supp. 2d 163, 172 (D.R.I. 2003).
164. Bainbridge & Gulati, supranote 149, at 86, 119-22.
165. In re Guidant Corp. Sec. Litig., 536 F. Supp. 2d 913, 928 n.15 (S.D. Ind.
2008) (dismissing as puffery a statement "in which Defendant Dollens expressed
his opinion that there was a very high likelihood that the J & J merger would
close").
166. Id. (dismissing as puffery a press release that "indicated an expectation
of continued strong market growth").
167. In re NVE Corp. Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 871, 896 (D. Minn. 2007).
168. City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651,
671 (6th Cir. 2005).
169. In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Sec. Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165, 180
(D.D.C. 2007).
170. In re Apple Computer, Inc., 127 F. App'x 296, 304 (9th Cir. 2005).
171. In reNVE Corp., 551 F.Supp. 2d at 898.
172. In re Bank of Am.Corp. Sec., Derivative,& ERISA Litig., 757 F.Supp.
2d 260, 314 (S.D.N.Y.2010).
173. Id.
174. Commc'ns Workers of Am. Plan for Emps. Pensions & Death Benefits
v.CSK Auto Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (D.Ariz. 2007).
175. Limantour v. Cray Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1153 (W.D.Wash.
2006).
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solutions";' 77
product; 176 the company's smart antennas are "ideal
178
and "we currently view our shares as undervalued.'
On the other hand, courts have held that the followingarguably equally vague and ambiguously optimistic-opinions are
potentially material: Sales and demand for a product are
"strong"; r 79 the company is "pleased" with its performance and
financial results °80
a pharmaceutical product was "well-received"
by physicians;141 interest in two technologies "has never been
83
higher"; 182 the second quarter indicated "increasing demand";'
the company's customer service is "great," "truly exceptional," and
"superior";' 4 the company is the "premier provider of high-speed
DSL services in the ' Northeast
corridor";1 s5 due diligence was
186
"very, very extensive.'
Indeed, consistent with these latter holdings, the Supreme
Court in Virginia Bankshares rejected the defendants' argument
that directors' opinions that a merger plan afforded "high" value
and that a merger price was "fair" were immaterial as a matter of
law.' 8 7 The company argued that no reasonable investor would
consider these "indefinite and unverifiable expressions" to be
important when deciding how to vote.188 Noting the information
imbalance between shareholders and directors and the common
understanding8 that directors owe fiduciary duties to
shareholders, 9 the Court held: "That such statements may be
176. Id.

177. In re Metawave Commc'ns Corp. Sec. Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1056,
1090-91 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
178. In re Staffinark, Inc. Sec. Litig., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1173 (E.D. Ark.

2000).

179. In re Dura Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1033 (S.D.
Cal. 2006).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Billhofer v. Flamel Techs., SA, 663 F. Supp. 2d 288, 298 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
183. In re Metawave Commc'ns Corp. Sec. Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1056,
1085-86 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
184. Scritchfield v. Paolo, 274 F. Supp. 2d 163, 184 (D.R.I. 2003).
185. Id. at 175.
186. In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 757 F. Supp.
2d 260, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
187. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090 (1991).
188. Id.

189. Id. at 1091 ("Shareholders know that directors usually have knowledge

and expertness far exceeding the normal investor's resources, and the directors'
perceived superiority is magnified even further by the common knowledge that
state law customarily obliges them to exercise their judgment in the
shareholders' interest.").
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materially significant raises no serious question."' 90 Yet, as the
former holdings demonstrate, courts routinely dismiss comparable
statements on the basis that they are immaterial as a matter of law.
In sum, courts do not consistently separate opinions that are
immaterial as a matter of law from those that are potentially
material. This chaos is not surprising because courts apply a
variety of vague, and sometimes analytically unsound, tests to

make this distinction.
1. The PrimaryTests CurrentlyApplied
a. The Unduly Vague Test
One of the tests most frequently applied to identify opinions
that are immaterial as a matter of law is the unduly vague
standard. 19 1 The Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc. court's explanation of
this standard is typical: "Vague statements of opinion are not
actionable under the federal securities laws because they are
considered 192immaterial and discounted by the market as mere
'puffing.""
Courts applying the unduly vague test look for words
like quality or best, which are "too squishy" and "too untethered to
anything measurable,"' 193 or similar words like sound
or efficient,
194
which are mere "generalized positive statements."'

190. Id.
at 1090.
191. In re Nokia OYJ (Nokia Corp.) Sec. Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 364, 397
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("The corporate puffery rule applies to loose optimism about
both a company's current state of affairs and its future prospects."); Limantour
v. Cray Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1146 (W.D. Wash. 2006) ("To determine
whether a statement is mere puffery, the Court must examine whether a
statement is so 'exaggerated' or 'vague' that no reasonable investor would rely
on the statement when considering the total mix of available information."); In
re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 766-67 (E.D. Va.
2004) ("Courts have demonstrated a willingness to find immaterial, as a matter
of law, a certain kind of rosy affirmation commonly heard from corporate
managers and familiar to the marketplace-loosely optimistic statements that are
so vague, so lacking in specificity, or so clearly constituting the opinions of the
speaker, that no reasonable investor could find them important to the total mix
of information available."); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d
186, 200-01 (3d Cir. 1990) ("To say that a statement is mere 'puffing' is, in
essence, to say that it is immaterial, either because it is so exaggerated ('You
cannot lose.') or so vague ('This bond is marvelous.') .... ").
192. Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1245 (N.D. Cal 1998).
193. City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651,
671 (6th Cir. 2005).
194. In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Sec. Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165, 180
(D.D.C. 2007).
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b. The Hyperbole Test
The hyperbole test is also frequently used to differentiate
immaterial opinions from those that are potentially material.195 As
the Eighth Circuit explained, some opinions are "such obvious
196
hyperbole that no reasonable investor would rely upon them.'
The Third Circuit cited the statement "you cannot lose" as an
opinion that is "so exaggerated" as to be immaterial as a matter of
law. 197 For example, courts have dismissed characterizations of
MRAM memory technology as "the Holy Grail of memory"' 98 and
of a new product called the G4 Cube as "the most beautiful product
[Apple] ever designed"' 199 as immaterial as a matter of law.
c. The Commonplace Test
Under the commonplace test, which often overlaps with the
unduly vague and hyperbole tests, courts dismiss opinions as
immaterial as a matter of law because they are "commonplace"
statements by a corporate manager. Courts have characterized
these opinions as "rosy affirmation[s] commonly heard from
corporate managers and familiar to the marketplace" 200 and as
"nothing more than a general platitude that accompanies nearly
every press release or public statement issued by a financial
institution." 201 Applying this test, one court in the Eastern District
of Arkansas explained:
In this case, the Defendants are credited with making such
comments as "we currently view our shares as
undervalued," and "StaffMark's share price ha[s] declined
below its fair value," and "we are buyers at these prices."
However, any investor tuning into a cable business
195. Limantour, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1146 ("To determine whether a statement
is mere puffery, the Court must examine whether a statement is so 'exaggerated'
or 'vague' that no reasonable investor would rely on the statement when

considering the total mix of available information.").
196. Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1997).

197. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 200-01 (3d Cir.

1990).

198. In re NVE Corp. Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 871, 895 (D. Minn. 2007)

(internal quotations omitted).

199. In re Apple Computer, Inc., 127 F. App'x 296, 301(9th Cir. 2005)

(alteration in original).
200. In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 766-67
(E.D. Va. 2004).
201. Woodward v. Raymond James Fin., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 425, 434-35
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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program on any given day would hear the same or similar
comments being made by some corporate executive touting
the strength of his company and the bargain price for which
its shares currently sell. No reasonable investor would be
influenced by such statements.202
For the same reason, a court in the Southern District of New
York dismissed the following opinion as immaterial as a matter of
law: "Raymond James' leadership believes that the managed
growth strategy, commitment to risk management and conservative
lending practices that helped the firm avert the subprime crisis and
post solid operating results in 2007
20 3 will continue to serve the
company well in the coming year.
2. A FundamentalFlaw in the PrimaryTests
In addition to their tendency to lead to inconsistent results, a
fundamental problem with these primary tests is that they fail to
recognize that a reasonable investor could actually rely on opinions
falling within these tests' scope. For example, "X product is a good
product" is a quintessential "unduly vague" statement. 204 And
indeed, courts applying the unduly vague standard are correct that
a reasonable investor would not rely on this representation as an
indication about the relative quality of X product.20 5 These courts
fail to recognize, however, that a reasonable investor could rely on
this statement as a representation that, at the very least, X product
has not been recalled. By dismissing the statement out of hand as
an unduly vague opinion, without an inquiry into what component
of the statement is allegedly false or misleading, courts sweep the
puffery brush too broadly.

202. In re Staffmark, Inc. Sec. Litig., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1173 (E.D. Ark.
2000) (alteration in original).
203. Woodward, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 434.
204. See Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 200-01 (3d
Cir. 1990) ("To say that a statement is mere 'puffing' is, in essence, to say that it
is immaterial, either because it is so exaggerated ('You cannot lose.') or so
vague ('This bond is marvelous.') ....
").
205. City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651,
671 (6th Cir. 2005). ("[S]uch statements describing a product in terms of
'quality' or 'best' or benefiting from 'aggressive marketing' are too squishy, too
untethered to anything measurable, to communicate anything that a reasonable
person would deem important to a securities investment decision. The
statements are analogous to those deemed immaterial by a broad spectrum of
federal courts.").
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Similarly, the statement that MRAM is "the Holy Grail of
memory" falls squarely within the hyperbole test.20 6 Again, courts
are correct that a reasonable investor would not rely on an opinion
like this one as a representation about whether MRAM has 300
gigabytes or 400 gigabytes of capacity. Courts fail to recognize,
however, that a reasonable investor could interpret this statement
as a representation that MRAM has at least some memory
capacity. Courts' dismissal of hyperbolic statements like this
without inquiring into what component of the opinion is allegedly
false is too simplistic.
Finally, opinions within the commonplace test suffer from the
same problem. For example, courts are correct that no reasonable
investor would interpret the opinion "we currently view our shares
as undervalued" as a representation that the shares' fundamental
value is higher than the market price, 207 but a reasonable investor
could interpret it as a representation that the company is not
insolvent, rendering its shares worthless. Dismissal of opinions like
this one without an inquiry into what component of the opinion is

allegedly false fails to recognize this nuance.
Indeed, the results of a recent materiality survey performed by
Professor Padfield are consistent with this analytical flaw. 208 The
survey presented five short factual scenarios, drawn from actual
cases in which alleged misrepresentations were dismissed as
immaterial, and asked participants if they would "consider the
additional information important in deciding whether to buy [the
company's] stock."20 9 For example, the survey presented some

background information about the demand for Telco's product, the
T-6500. Then, the survey asked the following question:
Assume you are now considering buying Telco stock and
you receive the following additional information: Later, in

response to a question, Telco's CEO states, "On the 6500,
demand for that product is exceeding our expectations."
in
Would you consider the additional information important
21°

deciding whether to buy Telco stock? Yes [or] no.
Sixty-two percent of the survey's respondents answered
"yes. ' 2n Professor Padfield interpreted the survey results as
206. In re NVE Corp. Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 871, 895 (D.Minn. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
207. In re Staffinark, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1173.

208. Stefan J. Padfield, Is Puffery Material to Investors? Maybe We Should
Ask Them, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 339 (2008).
209. Id. at 377-81.

210. Id. at 380.
211. Id. at373.
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suggesting "that judges are too quick to grant dismissals in
securities cases on the basis of puffery. 21 2
This author agrees with Professor Padfield's conclusion but
argues further that the survey highlights the importance of
incorporating alleged falsity into the materiality analysis. Notably
missing from the survey's factual scenarios were allegations about
why the statements were false. For example, on one hand, a
reasonable investor might very well consider the Telco CEO's
statement to be material because it implies that the 6500 product is
still in production. On the other hand, no reasonable investor
would consider the CEO's statement to constitute an implied
representation about a specific level of demand for the product.
Asking survey participants to assess the materiality of the
statement in a vacuum, effectively asking them to speculate for
themselves about why a statement might be misleading, invariably
leads to inconsistent results, as it did in this survey. The same
lesson applies to courts.
3. Courts 'Analytically UnsoundAttempts to Solve the Problem
with the Primary Tests
Implicitly recognizing that the primary tests sweep too broadly,
some courts have developed "exceptions" whereby opinions are
actionable despite falling within the scope of these tests. These
exceptions are analytically unsound, however, because they are
premised on the notion that establishing another element of
securities fraud can magically revive the materiality element.
The first exception applied by some courts is that puffery
becomes actionable if disbelieved. For example, a district court
in the Southern District of California explained this exception as
follows: "Ragland's December statements are optimistic
statements that usually are not actionable as securities fraud.
Plaintiffs rely on the exception to that general rule. They argue that
212. Id. at 375.
213. HAZEN, supra note 148, § 12.9[4] ("Reading the relevant securities
cases yields the following general rule: while a good faith opinion (or even

'puffing') is not material, a statement of opinion made with no belief in its truth
is actionable."). E.g., In re Moody's Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 507

(S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("Optimistic statements, however, 'may be actionable upon a

showing that the defendants did not genuinely or reasonably believe the positive
opinions they touted.., or that the opinions imply certainty."' (quoting Lapin v.
Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 221, 239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)));
Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., 499 F. Supp. 2d 117, 144-45 (D. Conn. 2007)
(suggesting that "non-actionable statements of opinion" are nonetheless
actionable if the defendants did not sincerely believe the opinions that they
purported to hold).
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Ragland knew his positive, public statements were inaccurate at
the time he made them."214 Similarly, a district court in the
Southern District of New York rejected the defendants' argument
that the alleged misstatements were nonactionable "statements of
opinion and puffery" because "opinion statements are actionable if
did not
Plaintiffs can plead 'with particularity that defendants
215
sincerely believe the opinion they purported to hold.'
This exception is analytically unsound because it is premised
on the notion that the presence of one element of securities fraudscienter-can transform an immaterial statement into a material
one. 2 16 This exception conflates the scienter and materiality
elements.
The second exception developed by courts is that puffery
becomes actionable if extremely false. 2 For example, a district
court in the Southern District of New York applied this exception
as follows:
[A]lthough statements that sales and demand for Ceclor CD
were "strong," that the Company was "pleased" with
Dura's performance and financial results, and that Ceclor
CD was "well received" by physicians are generalized, the
facts alleged in the TAC lead to a strong inference that
there was no reasonable basis for believing such statements
to be true because the sales were achieved by overloading

214. In re REMEC Inc. See. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1231 (S.D. Cal.
2010) (citations omitted).
215. In re DRDGold Ltd. Sec. Litig., 472 F. Supp. 2d 562, 569 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (quoting Podany v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 146, 154

(S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
216.

See In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Sec. Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165,

177 (D.D.C. 2007) ("Under the doctrine established by Virginia Bankshares v.
Sandberg... statements of opinion, if they are material, may be actionable if
they are not actually believed when made, if there is no reasonable basis for
them, or if the speaker is aware of undisclosed facts that tend seriously to
undermine the statements' accuracy." (emphasis added)).
217. E.g., In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 768
(E.D. Va. 2004) ("Plaintiffs, in rebuttal, cite In re Cinar Corp. Sec. Litig., 186 F.
Supp. 2d 279, 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25

F.3d 1124, 1129 (2d Cir. 1994)), which holds that puffery is acceptable only
'[if] the company has some legitimate reason to be optimistic.' . . . Even under
CINAR, Defendants had, as most corporate executives do, some legitimate

reason for optimism." (alteration in original)); Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113
F.3d 738, 746-47 (7th Cir. 1997) (characterizing the puffery inquiry as whether
a company said things that were so discordant with reality that they would
induce a reasonable investor to buy the stock at a higher price than it was worth
ex ante).
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wholesalers with the product. Accordingly,21the
puffery rule
8
does not insulate Defendants from liability.
A district court in the Southern District of Texas stated the
exception similarly:
Standing alone, general statements of corporate optimism
are often held by courts to be immaterial as a matter of law.
However, when juxtaposed to allegations of falsity capable
of proof by evidence of historical fact, generally optimistic
statements are not immune from charges of fraud merely
because they are vague, conclusory expressions of opinion
and belief2 1 about
a company's then-current and/or future
9
prospects.
Applying this exception, courts have held that the following
statements-which fall within the scope of the primary puffery
tests-are nonetheless actionable: that the company's customer
service is "great " "truly exceptional," "superior," the "best," and
"world class";22 that orders during the quarter indicated
"increasing demand"; 221 222
and that interest and certain technology
has "never been higher."
Again, this exception is premised on the analytically unsound
idea that the presence of one element of securities fraud-here,
falsity--can transform an immaterial statement into a material
one. 2 3 This exception conflates the falsity and materiality
elements.

218. In re Dura Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1033 (S.D.
Cal. 2006).
219. United States v. Causey, No. CRIM. H-05-025-SS, 2005 WL 2647976,
at *9 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2005).
220. Scritchfield v. Paolo, 274 F. Supp. 2d 163, 184 (D.R.I. 2003).
221. In re Metawave Commc'ns Corp. Sec. Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1056,

1086 (W.D. Wash. 2003).

222. Billhofer v. Flamel Techs., SA, 663 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 (S.D.N.Y
2009) (rejecting a puffery argument) ("Even if companies measure 'interest' in
their products in a variety of ways, they cannot then make categorical claims
that interest has never been higher without some basis for that statement.").

223. Commc'ns Workers of Am. Plan for Emps. Pensions & Death Benefits

v. CSK Auto Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (D. Ariz. 2007) ("No matter

how untrue a statement may be, it is not actionable if it is not the type of
statement that would significantly alter the total mix of information available to
investors." (quoting Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1245 (N.D.
Cal. 1998))).
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C. Courts Should Apply the Novel Reasonable Implication Test to
Identify Opinions That Are ImmaterialAs a Matter of Law
This Article proposes that courts apply the following
reasonable implication test to distinguish potentially material
opinions from those that are immaterial as a matter of law: Does
the opinion reasonably imply an allegedly false, material fact?
Several scholars, without citation to authority for this test, have
assumed that a test similar to the reasonable implication test
applies when analyzing whether a statement of opinion is material.
Professor Thomas Lee Hazen, in the treatise The Law of Securities
Regulation, characterizes as a "general rule" that "merely because
statements are couched as opinion does not preclude a finding that
224
there is an express or implied misrepresentation of fact."
Similarly, Professor Peter Huang, in passing, stated: "To be legally
actionable, puffery must induce false implied meanings that are
thus deceptive, misleading, and can be disproved."225 Courts have
not adopted this test, however. This Article seeks to provide a
theoretical basis for the reasonable implication test, with the goal
of convincing courts to apply this test when analyzing the
materiality of statements of opinion.
1. Solution to the Analytical Problem Underlying the Primary
Tests
This proposed reasonable implication test solves the analytical
problem underlying the primary tests currently used to differentiate
immaterial opinions from those that are potentially material
because it incorporates an inquiry into what component of the
opinion is allegedly false or misleading. For example, the
materiality of the vague opinion "X product is a good product"
would depend on why the plaintiff contended that the opinion was
false. If the plaintiff contended that this opinion was false because
the product was of lesser quality than competitors' products, the
court would dismiss the opinion as immaterial as a matter of law.
The opinion, with its use of the vague226word great, does not
reasonably imply this allegedly false fact. On the other hand, if
224. HAZEN, supra note 148, § 12.9[4].
225. Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking
the Materiality of Information and the Reasonableness of Investor, 13 SUP. CT.

ECON. REv. 99, 115 (2005).

226. See Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 200-01 (3d
Cir. 1990) ("To say that a statement is mere 'puffing' is, in essence, to say that it
is immaterial, either because it is so exaggerated ('You cannot lose.') or so
vague ('This bond is marvelous.')....").
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the plaintiff contended that this opinion was false because the
product had been recalled for safety defects, the court would rule
that the opinion is potentially material. The opinion reasonably
implies that the product is still marketable, which-as alleged-is
a false, material fact.
Similarly, the materiality of the hyperbolic statement that
MRAM is "the Holy Grail of memory" would depend on why the
plaintiff contended that the opinion was false. If the plaintiff
contended that it were false because the memory only had 300
gigabytes of capacity, the court would dismiss the opinion as
immaterial as a matter of law because the hyperbolic statement
does not imply a specific memory capacity. If, however, the
plaintiff contended that the statement was false because the
MRAM did not have any memory capacity, the court would rule
that the opinion is potentially material because the opinion
reasonably implies that MRAM has at least some memory, which
is an allegedly false, material fact.
Likewise, the materiality of the commonplace opinion "we
currently view our shares as undervalued" would depend on why
the plaintiff contended that the opinion was false. If the plaintiff
contended that the opinion were false because fundamental value
did not exceed market price, the court would dismiss the opinion as
immaterial as a matter of law because no reasonable investor
would imply from such a commonplace statement a specific
fundamental value.2 27 If, however, the plaintiff contended that this
opinion were false because the company was insolvent and its
shares worthless, the court would rule that the opinion was
potentially material. A reasonable investor could imply from the
opinion that the shares had at least some value-an allegedly false,
material fact.
Judge Thomas S. Zilly in the Western District of Washington
applied an analysis similar to the reasonableimplication test when
analyzing the materiality of the opinions that product orders during
the second quarter indicated "increasing demand" and that
"[b]ecause of this, [the compan8y] anticipate[s] improved results in
the second half of the year." 22 Under the reasonable implication
test, the materiality of these opinions would depend on the
allegedly false component. If the plaintiff contended that these
opinions implied a greater degree of demand than actually existed,
the court should dismiss the claim because no reasonable investor
227.

In re Staffmark, Inc. Sec. Litig., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1173 (E.D. Ark.

2000).
228. In re Metawave Commc'ns Corp. Sec. Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1056,
1062 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
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would interpret these vague statements as implying a certain level
of demand. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff contended that these
opinions implied that the product was marketable, the court should
not dismiss the claim because a reasonable investor could so
interpret these statements. Judge Zilly's analysis echoes the
analysis under the proposed test: "The statements about GSM
demand did not merely exaggerate the amount of demand, but
represented that there actually was demand when the GSM product
was not functional. 229
The statements could be relied upon by a
reasonable investor."
Thus, this proposed reasonable implication test is an
analytically sound means of addressing the concerns underlying
the analytically unsound puffery is actionable if disbelieved and
puffery is actionable if reallyfalse "exceptions.",230 The essence of
both exceptions is that a vague, optimistic, or commonplace
opinion should be actionable if reality differs drastically from the
tone of the opinion statement. The reasonable implication test for
materiality is consistent with this essence, but it achieves this goal
in an analytically sound manner. For example, under current tests,
the opinion "this company is in great shape" would likely be
characterized as puffery because it is unduly vague and
commonplace. If the speaker knew at the time of the statement that
the company would seek bankruptcy protection within 24 hours,
some courts would attempt to apply one of the analytically
unsound exceptions to puffery-either because the speaker
disbelieved the opinion or because the opinion was really false-in
order to restore the opinion's materiality. Under the reasonable
implication test, however, this opinion would be deemed
potentially material, without resort to these analytically unsound
exceptions. The court would recognize that, although a reasonable
investor would not rely on the opinion as a statement about the
company's relative profitability, a reasonable investor could
231
interpret the opinion as implying that the company was solvent.
Because the plaintiff alleged that, in fact, the company was
insolvent at the time of the statement, the opinion was material
because it reasonably implied an allegedly false, material fact.
229. Id.
at 1086.
230. See supra Part IV.B.3.
231. Cf Eisenstadt, 113 F.3d at 745 ("Suppose that on February 18 Centel's
lawyers had told Centel that it couldn't legally sell any of its assets because they
were encumbered and the lienors would not give their consent to a sale. In these
circumstances to have announced that the auction process was going smoothly
would have been materially deceptive. 'Going smoothly' may mean nothing
more than-going; but it means at least that...").
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2. Consistent with Well-Reasoned Court Opinions in Securities
FraudContext
This proposed reasonableimplication test is consistent with the
similar recognition of some courts that the materiality of an
opinion depends on whether the opinion reasonably implies the
existence of objective facts232 or if it implies certainty. 2r 3 As the
most extreme example, if the opinion not only implies, but also
explicitly states, that it is supported by "objective data," it is
potentially material because it gives rise to a reasonable belief in
the existence of allegedly false facts.234 Similarly, if an opinion
reasonably implies the existence of false, material facts, it is
potentially material.235 For instance, the opinion that due diligence
232. In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 757 F. Supp.
2d 260, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[T]here is a difference between enthusiastic
statements amounting to general puffery and opinion-based statements that are
anchored in 'misrepresentations of existing facts."' (quoting Novak v. Kasaks,
216 F.3d 300, 315 (2nd Cir. 2000))); Id. ("These statements fall into the
category of fact-based expressions of opinion rather than enthusiastic, vague,
forward-looking puffery.").
233. In re Moody's Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 509 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (including the heading, "Even if Statements by Moody's Were Puffery,
They Implied Certainty"); Lapin v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d
221, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("The important limitation on these principles is that
optimistic statements may be actionable upon a showing that ...the opinions
imply certainty.").
234. City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651,
675 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[W]e conclude that a reasonable juror in this case could
conclude that Firestone's statement that 'the objective data clearly reinforces our
belief that these are high-quality, safe tires' carried with it the representation that
there was a reasonable basis for that belief, and that Firestone was not aware of
any undisclosed facts tending to seriously undermine the accuracy of the
statement, and that both those representations were misleading."). See also In re
NVE Corp. Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 871, 894 (D. Minn. 2007) ("However,
the Bridgestone case hinged on the fact that the company had stated that
'objective data' supported its claim. Optimistic statements by Defendants in this
case regarding the general importance and quality of the MRAM technology did
not contain any assertion that the statements were supported by 'objective data'
or were otherwise subject to verification by proof.").
235. E.g., Scritchfield v. Paolo, 274 F. Supp. 2d 163, 174 (D.R.I. 2003)
("The contribution of Peritus is its emphasis on the objectively reasonable
inferences, once again supported by context, that can be drawn from the
challenged language; statements that only evince subjective beliefs or opinions
are not actionable.") (discussing In re Peritus Software Servs., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
52 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D. Mass. 1999)); Nanopierce Tech., Inc. v. Southridge
Capital Mgmt. LLC, No. 02-Civ-0767, 2003 WL 21507294, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
June 30, 2003) ("[T]he misleading character o[f] a statement is not changed by
its vagueness or ambiguity. Liability may follow where management
intentionally fosters a mistaken belief concerning a material fact, such as its
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was "very, very extensive" was a potentially material "fact-based
expression[] of opinion"; 236 and the opinion that a firm was the
"premier provider of high-speed DSL services in the Northeast

corridor" reasonably implied that the firm was "comparatively
superior to all other high-speed DSL service providers in the
Northeast." 237 If, on the other hand, the opinion does not

reasonably im 8 y any allegedly false facts, it is immaterial as a
matter of law. Similarly, if the opinion does not imply certainty
or is a mere "naked" opinion, it is immaterial as a matter of law.23
3. Supportive of Policies UnderlyingMaterialityElement
First, the reasonable implication test responds to the
widespread scholarly criticism that the puffery doctrine fails to
incorporate a contextual inquiry. 240 The reasonableimplication test
proposed in this Article resolves the tension between the puffery
doctrine and the "total mix" mandate by incorporating context into
the materiality analysis. 24' Especially relevant to the inquiry into

whether an opinion implies any false material facts is the following
contexts: (1) why the plaintiff contends that the opinion is false;

evaluation of the company's progress and earning prospects in the current year."
(quoting Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 1980))).
236. In re Bank ofAm., 757 F. Supp. 2d. at 310.
237. Scritchfield, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
238. E.g., In reNo. Nine Visual Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1, 21
(D. Mass. 1999) ("Instead, the Class' only quibble with the statement is the
implicit meaning that they attribute to the phrase 'broad product line.' The Court
holds, however, that the phrase is incapable of supporting such an inference, as
any reasonable investor would recognize the phrase simply as bullish corporate
grandstanding.").
239. In re Moody's Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 507 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) ("Optimistic statements, however, 'may be actionable upon a showing
that the defendants did not genuinely or reasonably believe the positive opinions
they touted . . . or that the opinions imply certainty."' (quoting Lapin v.
Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 221, 239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))); id.
at 509 ("Moreover, even if the above mentioned statements asserting
independence were ones of intention or desire, they also 'imply certainty,' and
therefore fall into the limitation on the general rule . . . ."); Scritchfield, 274 F.
Supp. 2d at 182 ("Cornell's forecast that LOA would have 100,000 customers
by the end of 2000 is a forward-looking statement and does not purport to be
based on any factual information, whether or not properly calculated, available
at that time. It is a naked prediction unsupported by any facts, and would not be
deemed material by a reasonable investor. It is not actionable."); id. at 187
("Likewise, Cornell's prediction of $15 million in revenues by the end of 2000
is just that-a naked and unsupported prediction, which is unactionable ...
240. See supra Part IV.A.
241. See supra Part IV.A.
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(2) whether the opinion was expressed in such a way as to imply
any facts (including the apparent authoritativeness of the speaker);
and (3) whether the opinion was accompanied by its complete
factual basis, 24thereby
preventing it from implying any false
2
facts.
material
In addition, the reasonableimplication test bolsters the delicate
balance between ensuring honest markets and encouraging the
appropriate level of disclosure. 24 3 On one hand, by acknowledging
that some opinions are reasonably understood as implying false
material facts and by allowing these opinions to form the basis of
securities fraud claims, the reasonableimplication test incentivizes
honesty of market participants. On the other hand, by recognizing
that some opinions are not reasonably understood as implying false
material facts and by characterizing these opinions as immaterial
as a matter of law, the reasonable implication test encourages
company actors to speak freely about their evaluations and
inferences, without fear that unreasonable implications could lead
to liability.
4. Builds on Materiality Tests Proposedby Other Scholars
The reasonable implication test, to be applied when analyzing
the materiality of statements of opinion, builds on the scholarly
work to date on the element of materiality. Scholars addressing the
materiality-puffery quandary, albeit not limiting their analyses to
statements of opinion, have proposed various "materiality tests" to
aid courts in drawing the line between those statements that are
immaterial as a matter of law and those that are potentially
material. These various proposed materiality tests circle around the
same point: Because allegedly puffing statements are sometimes
expressed when access to information is unequal, investors can
infer false material facts from them. For example, Professor
O'Hare, recognizing that allegedly puffing statements are often
244
made to investors when there are information asymmetries,
argues that the court should examine the following factors to
determine whether an allegedly puffing statement is immaterial as
a matter of law: (1) the vagueness of the statement; (2) whether the
statement is forward-looking or characterizing present facts; and
(3) whether other factors are present that affect significance to
investors. 245 Similarly, Professor Langevoort, in the context of
242.
243.
244.
245.

See infra Part W.C.5.
See supra Part IV.A.
O'Hare, supra note 12, at 1717-19.
Id. at 1737.
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half-truths (where, by definition, some information is withheld
from investors), argues that the first step is to "assessf[]the normal
inference that flows from a particular statement." ' Professor
Hoffman argues that, once a statement has been identified as
"puffery," courts should presume that the statement implied false
factual claims that were relied upon, with the burden shifting to the
speaker to rebut that presumption by showing one of the following:
(1) The speaker did not intend to mislead; (2) most of the audience
did not rely on the statement; or (3) the statement did not imply
any false facts.247

This Article proposes that, at least in the context of statements
of opinion, this central point should itself be elevated to the level
of a "materiality test." Indeed, the reasonable implication test
proposed in this Article asks that very question-Does the opinion
reasonably imply an allegedly false, material fact?
Moreover, again not confining their analyses to statements of
opinion, scholars have decried the difficulty of determining
whether an allegedly puffing statement implies any false, material
facts. 248 Yet, in the context of opinions at least, well-developed
bodies of precedent analyze that very question in the contexts of
defamation and common law fraud. Courts applying the
reasonable implication test can therefore draw from these deep
bodies of law to analyze this issue in the securities fraud context.
5.Informed by Comparable Test Applied in Defamation
Context
The reasonable implication test proposed in this Article to

differentiate immaterial opinions from those that are potentially
material in securities fraud cases is informed by the comparable
pure-mixed opinion test applied in defamation cases. The rich
precedent developed in the context of defamation is an instructive
guide on the application of this Article's proposed reasonable
implication test in securities fraud cases.
As in the contexts of securities fraud and common-law fraud,
some statements of opinion are not actionable in defamation, while
others are potentially actionable. 249 In the defamation context,
however, the distinction between these two types of opinions is not
246. Langevoort, supra note 13, at 99.
247. Hoffman, supra note 14, at 1444.
248. E.g., id. at 1440 ("Unfortunately, neither courts nor regulators can easily
determine when puffery implies facts that are false.").
249. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 566 (1977).

2013]

OPINIONS ACTIONABLE

437

premised on the concept of materiality. Rather, it is premised on
whether the opinion is "mixed"---and thus actionable because it
implies an undisclosed defamatory fact-or "pure"---and thus
nonactionable because it does not imply any undisclosed
defamatory facts.25 0 At least for evaluative opinions, this
distinction is compelled by the First Amendment's protection of
free expression.25 Scholars are divided on whether the First
Amendment compels a similar distinction for deductive
opinions. 252 As a practical matter, however, this pure-mixed
distinction applies to both deductive and evaluative opinions in
defamation cases because the Second Restatement of Torts and
most state courts have incorporated the pure-mixed distinction into
the elements of defamation without
distinguishing between
25 3
evaluative and deductive opinions.
The defamation precedent developed with respect to the
distinction between pure and mixed opinions might seem, at first
glance, to be inapposite to the distinction between material and
immaterial opinions in the securities fraud context. In fact, the
pure-mixed distinction and the material-immaterial distinction
share a similar underlying policy and a similar focus on the
opinion's effect on a reasonable listener, justifying further
examination of the dividing line in defamation cases between pure
and mixed opinions.
250. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566

(1977).

251. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19 (citing the "breathing space" that "[flreedoms
of expression require in order to survive" (quoting Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986))).

252. Compare Sowle, supra note 119, at 575-77 (arguing that pure deductive
opinions should not be immunized); Chen, supra note 119, at 375 (arguing that
the Restatement's protection of pure deductive opinions goes further than
required by Milkovich); KEETON, supra note 118, § 113 (arguing that a
distinction could be made between evaluative opinions and deductive opinions,
with the First Amendment's protection for pure opinions applying only to
evaluation opinions); with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c
(1977) (asserting that First Amendment protection of "pure" opinion extends to
all opinions).
253. King, supra note 119, at 906 (recognizing that the "uncertain . . .
constitutional underpinnings of the section 566 rule may prove to have more
academic than practical importance" because state courts have widely adopted
the rule, if not as a matter of constitutional law, then as a matter of state law);
KEETON, supra note 118, § 113 (explaining that the Restatement takes the
position "that the publication of a derogatory opinion that is a pure opinion of
either the deductive or evaluative variety is no longer actionable, however
dishonest the publisher might be in expressing that opinion"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977) (applying the pure-mixed distinction to both
evaluative and deductive opinions).
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a. ComparablePolicies Underlie the DistinctionBetween Pure
and Mixed Opinions and Between MaterialandImmaterial
Opinions
The balancing test underlying the distinction between pure and
mixed opinions is comparable to the balancing test underlying the
distinction between material and immaterial opinions. When
crafting the pure-mixed standard to distinguish between opinions
that are actionable in defamation and those that are protected by
the First Amendment, the Supreme Court carefully balanced the
Constitution's protection of freedom of expression with society's
interest in preventing and compensating defamatory attacks on
citizens' reputations. 4 The Supreme Court described this balance
as follows:
The numerous decisions discussed above establishing First
Amendment protection for defendants in defamation
actions surely demonstrate the Court's recognition of the
Amendment's vital guarantee of free and uninhibited
discussion of public issues. But there is also another side to
the equation; we have regularly acknowledged the
"important social values which underlie the law of
defamation," and recognized that "[s]ociety has a pervasive
and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks
upon reputation." . . . We believe
255 our decision in the
present case holds the balance true.
As discussed above,256 the materiality element of securities
fraud accomplishes a similar balance between encouraging
disclosure by insulating immaterial statements from liability and
promoting fair and honest257markets by imposing liability on
material misrepresentations.
Additionally, both the materiality analysis in securities fraud
and the pure-mixed opinion distinction in defamation focus on the
effect of the statement on a reasonable, objective listener. The
materiality analysis focuses on whether there is "a substantial
likelihood that the . . . fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having sifnificantly altered the total mix of
information made available." 25 An investor cannot recover in
254. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 22-23.

255. Id. at 22-23 (citation omitted).
256. See supra Part IV.A.
257. See Couture, supra note 145, at 28-29; see also Hoffrnan, supra note
14, at 1398.
258. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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securities fraud for a misrepresentation that he or she subjectively
found important if a reasonable investor would not have done so,
and a speaker cannot escape liability by contending that he or she
did not consider the statement important if a reasonable investor
would have done so. Similarly, the distinction between a pure and
a mixed opinion focuses on whether "the recipient draws the
reasonable conclusion that the derogatory opinion expressed in the
comment must have been based on undisclosed defamatory
facts."' 25 9 A subject of the statement cannot recover in defamation
if a recipient unreasonably interpreted an opinion as implying
undisclosed defamatory facts if a reasonable recipient would not
have so interpreted it, and a speaker cannot escape liability by
contending that he or she unreasonably interpreted true facts to
reach his opinion if a reasonable recipient of the
260 opinion would
have interpreted it as implying defamatory facts.
b. The Pure-Mixed Opinion DistinctionDepends on Whether
the OpinionImplies a DefamatoryFact
The distinction between a nonactionable "pure" opinion and an
actionable "mixed" opinion depends on whether the opinion
implies any "undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the
opinion.' 261 Stated another way, the key is whether the
"expressions of opinion could be interpreted as including false
assertions as to factual matters." 262 Pure opinions
• • •263do not imply any
undisclosed defamatory facts, while mixed opinions do.
One key to assess whether an opinion implies any undisclosed
defamatory facts is whether the opinion's complete factual basis is
stated by the speaker or assumed by both parties. If the complete
factual basis of an opinion is stated or assumed, the opinion is
unlikely to imply the existence of other unstated defamatory

259. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c (1977).

260. See id.
("The defendant cannot insist that the undisclosed facts were not
defamatory but that he unreasonably formed the derogatory opinion from
them.").
261. Id.
262. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 515 (1991). See

also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (explaining that the

distinction depends on whether the opinion "contain[s] a provably false factual

connotation"); Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151 F.3d 180, 184 (4th Cir.

1998) ("Milkovich directs that an opinion may constitute actionable defamation,
but only if the opinion can be reasonably interpreted to declare or imply untrue
facts.").
263. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 566 cmt. b (1977).
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facts. 264 The D.C. Circuit explained the rationale as follows:
"Because the reader understands that such supported opinions
represent the writer's interpretation of the facts presented, and
because the reader is free to draw his or her own conclusions based
upon those facts, this type of statement is not actionable in
defamation., 265 On the other hand, if the opinion's complete
factual basis is not stated, the opinion may imply the existence of
unstated defamatory facts.266
As an example of a pure opinion, the Fourth Circuit dismissed
a defamation claim premised on the opinion that "investors will
sour on 'Sugaree'" because "the article clearly disclosed the
factual bases for its view. ' 267 The Restatement gives the following
further example and explanation of a pure opinion:
A writes to B about his neighbor C: "He moved in six
months ago. He works downtown, and I have seen him
during that time only twice, in his backyard around 5:30
seated in a deck chair with a portable radio listening to a
news broadcast, and with a drink in his hand. I think he
must be an alcoholic." The statement indicates the facts on
which the expression of opinion was based and does not
imply others. These facts
268 are not defamatory and A is not
liable for defamation.

As an example of a mixed opinion that is potentially actionable
as defamatory, the Supreme Court in Milkovich cited the

264. Id.; Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1993)
(noting that when "the bases for the . . . conclusion are fully disclosed, no
reasonable reader would consider the term anything but the opinion of the author
drawn from the circumstances related"); Standing Comm. on Discipline v.
Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1439 (9th Cir. 1995) ("A statement of opinion based on
fully disclosed facts can be punished only if the stated facts are themselves false
and demeaning."); Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publ'ns, 953 F.2d 724,
730-31 (1st Cir. 1992) (when statement provides factual bases for its
conclusion, it is a "personal conclusion" rather than a statement of fact subject to
a defamation claim).
265. Moldea v. New York Times Co., 15 F.3d 1137, 1144-45 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. b (1977) ("The second
kind of expression of opinion, or the mixed type, is one which, while an opinion
in form or context, is apparently based on facts regarding the plaintiff or his
conduct that have not been stated by the defendant or assumed to exist by the
parties to the communication.").
267. Biospherics, Inc., 151 F.3d at 185 ("[T]hese three sentences state the
factual basis for the entire article and Biospherics does not challenge their
accuracy. Its failure to do so dooms its challenge to this statement.").
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 illus. 4 (1977).
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following: "In my opinion John Jones is a liar."269 As the Court
explained, this opinion is potentially actionable because it "implies
a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told
an untruth. ' 270 The Milkovich Court then applied this standard to
the allegedly defamatory statements before it, including the
statement that "[a]nyone who attended the meet ...knows in his
heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having
given his solemn oath to tell the truth." 27 ' The Court reasoned:
"The dispositive question in the present case then becomes
whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements
in the Diadiun column imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich
perjured himself in a judicial proceeding. We think this question
must be answered in the affirmative." 27rAs another example, the
Restatement juxtaposes the following illustration of a mixed
opinion with the illustration of a pure opinion cited in the
preceding paragraph: "A writes to B about his neighbor C: 'I think
he must be an alcoholic.' A jury might find that this was not just an
expression of opinion but that it implied
273 that A knew undisclosed
opinion."
this
justify
would
that
facts
A second key to distinguishing pure and mixed opinions is to
recognize that some opinions-such as hyperbole and mere verbal
abuse---"cannot reasonably be understood to be meant literally and
seriously., 274 With respect to hyperbole, the Supreme Court
explained that "[t]his provides assurance that public debate will not
suffer for lack of 'imaginative expression' or the 'rhetorical
hyperbole' which has traditionally added much to the discourse of
our Nation., 275 For example, the characterization of a developer's
negotiating position as "blackmail" was not actionable because
"the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous
epithet used by those who considered [the] negotiating position
extremely unreasonable. ' 276 Similarly, the definition of a union
scab as a traitor was not actionable because it was "merely
269. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1,18 (1990).
at 18-19.
270. Id.

at 4-5.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 21.

273. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 illus. 3 (1977).
274. Id. § 566 cmt. e (1977); Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-20 (explaining that
mere hyperbole is not actionable in defamation because it "cannot 'reasonably
[be] interpreted as stating actual facts' about an individual").
275. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)); Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 50 (ad parody "could
not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public
figure involved").
276. Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14
(1970).
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rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the
contempt felt by union members. 277 As a close corollary, verbal
abuse by angry speakers is unlikely to imply any defamatory facts
when "it is obvious that the speaker has lost his temper and is
merely giving vent to insult."278For example, "when, in the course
of an altercation, the defendant loudly and angrily calls the
plaintiff a bastard in the presence of others, he is ordinarily not
reasonably to be understood
as asserting the fact that the plaintiff is
279
of illegitimate birth.,
c. The Defamation Precedenton Mixed-Pure Opinions Informs
the ProposedReasonable Implication Test
First, as explained above, applying the pure-mixed opinion test
in defamation cases, courts have frequently held that opinions
accompanied by their factual basis (whether stated by the speaker
or assumed by both parties) are not actionable in defamation
because they do not connote false facts. 280 Drawing from this
defamation precedent, courts should similarly hold for purposes of
securities fraud that an opinion based on fully disclosed or
mutually assumed facts is immaterial as a matter of law because no
reasonable investor would interpret the opinion as implying any
unstated material facts. If an opinion is accompanied by accurate
factual statements that provide the basis for the opinion, the
opinion would fail the proposed reasonable implication test
because it would not reasonably imply any unstated facts.2 8' Thus,
the opinion would be immaterial as a matter of law.
Indeed, a few courts have already recognized in the securities
fraud context that whether an opinion is accompanied by its factual
basis is relevant to whether the opinion is material.28 2 For example,
277. Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin,
418 U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974).
278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. e (1977).

279. Id.
280. See supra Part IV.C.5.b.

281. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 539(1) (1977) ("A statement
of opinion as to facts not disclosed and not otherwise known to the recipient
may, if it is reasonableto do so, be interpreted by him as an implied statement
(a) that the facts known to the maker are not incompatible with his opinion; or
(b) that he knows facts sufficient to justify him in forming it." (emphasis
added)).
282. E.g., Payne v. DeLuca, 433 F. Supp. 2d 547, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2006) ("The
press release dated April 27, 2000, included several statements which we
consider puffery. Mr. DeLuca is quoted as saying, 'The recent contract awards
demonstrate our excellent reputation with a diverse range of clients and our
broad and sophisticated skill base. Our April announcement of the acquisition of
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Judge Lynch in the Southern District of New York rejected a
securities fraud claim based on the opinion that "Winstar was fully
funded" because the defendants disclosed the basis for their
opinion:
Plaintiffs' contention that "there was no reasonable good
faith basis to conclude with confidence that Winstar was
fully funded" also misrepresents the reports at issue,
because the reports clearly disclose the basis for
defendants' claim that Winstar was fully funded.
Considering all the circumstances, plaintiffs cannot prevail
on a claim that defendants recklessly failed to disclose the
lack of a reasonable basis for optimistic statements
regarding Winstar's future funding if defendants'
reports
28 3
plainly disclosed the basis for their statements.
The precedent on this issue in the defamation context should help
courts apply the evaluation-inferencetest.
Further, courts in the securities fraud context already recognize
the necessity of assessing the impact of an alleged
misrepresentation on the "total mix of information" available to
investors.2 8 4 This total mix analysis is comparable to the
defamation analysis of whether an opinion is accompanied by its
factual basis.28 5 Indeed, the weighty precedent in the defamation
context to determine whether certain facts were stated or assumed
could help guide courts as they perform a similar analysis in the
securities fraud context.286

W & H Pacific, Inc., . . . provides further evidence of the success of our
diversification strategy."' (emphasis removed)); Limantour v. Cray Inc., 432 F.
Supp. 2d 1129, 1147 (W.D. Wash. 2006) ("To the extent these [factual]
statements (most of which are not alleged to be false) have any effect, they raise

an inference in Defendants' favor that there was a factual basis for the positive
statements concerning 2004 earnings.").

283. In re Salomon Analyst Winstar Litig., No. 02-Civ-6171, 2006 WL
510526, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006).

284. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988).
285. See supra Part IV.C.5.b.
286. E.g., DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER's GUIDE § 8.2 (2010)

(citing cases) ("Where the defendant does not express or state the underlying
facts, they may nonetheless be 'assumed facts.' This assumption of facts might
be justified for a number of reasons-some third party has stated them, the
specific or specialized knowledge of the recipient, i.e., 'knowledgeable listeners'
due to the publicity given the facts by the local media, a prior press release
issued by defendant, the demonstrated presence of the facts in the public domain
in the area of publication, or prior articles or editorials in the same newspaper.").
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Finally, as explained above, mere hyperbole or verbal abuse is
not actionable in defamation because it "cannot 'reasonably [be]
interpreted as stating actual facts' about an individual., 287 Courts,
when drawing the line between nonactionable puffery and
potentially material opinions for purposes of securities fraud, can
similarly draw on this rich defamation precedent to identify those
opinions that are so hyperbolic that they do not reasonably imply
any false, material facts.
6. Consistent with ComparableTest Applied in Common Law
FraudContext
Although the Second Restatement of Torts does not articulate a
test to differentiate between opinions potentially actionable at
common law and mere puffery,2 88 a close study of the examples
cited in the Restatement commentary shows that they are
consistent with the reasonable implication test proposed in this
Article.
The tension between potentially actionable opinions and
immaterial puffery exists in common-law fraud, as in securities
fraud. The Restatement does not articulate a test to differentiate
between potentially actionable opinions and mere puffery, instead
merely recognizing that "some allowance must be made for
puffing or depreciation by an adverse party. ' 289 To exemplify this
"some allowance," the commentary states that the opinion that a
bond is a "good investment" is potentially actionable,29 ° while a
dealer's opinions that an automobile he is selling is a "dandy," a
of1 our line," or "the best in
"bearcat," a "good little car," "the pride 29
the American market" are mere puffery.

287. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990) ("This
provides assurance that public debate will not suffer for lack of 'imaginative
expression' or the 'rhetorical hyperbole' which has traditionally added much to
the discourse of our Nation." (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 50 (1988))); Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 50 (Ad parody "could not
reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure
involved."); Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14
(1970); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin,
418 U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974).
288. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 539 cmt. a (1977) (merely
recognizing that "some allowance must be made for puffing or depreciation by an
adverse party").

289. Id.
290. Id.
291.

Id.§ 542 cmt. e.
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First, the Restatement classifies the opinion that a bond is a
"good investment" as potentially actionable. 292 The commentary
clarifies that this opinion is not mere puffing "if the vendor knows
that the interest on the bond has for years been in default and the
corporation that issued it is in the hands of a receiver. '293 The
commentary explains that "such a statement is so far removed from
the truth as to make it a fraudulent misrepresentation of the
character of the bond." 294 This result is consistent with the
proposed reasonable implication test. If the "bond is a good
investment" opinion were allegedly false because the bond was
merely a mediocre investment, the opinion would be immaterial as
a matter of law because no reasonable investor would infer a
specific quality of investment from such a vague statement. If, on
the other hand, the opinion were allegedly false because the bond
is in default, the opinion would be potentially material because a
reasonable investor would interpret this opinion as implying that
the bond was not in default. Therefore, the Restatement
commentary and this Article's proposed reasonable implication
test reach the same result.
On the other hand, the Restatement classifies as nonactionable
puffery a dealer's opinions that an automobile he is selling is a
"dandy," a "bearcat," a "good little car," "the pride of our line," or
"the best in the American market." 295 The Restatement's
commentary does not explain why these opinions were allegedly
false. Instead, it merely concludes that these opinions are
immaterial as a matter of law:
It is common knowledge and may always be assumed that
any seller will express a favorable opinion concerning what
he has to sell; and when he praises it in general terms,
without specific content or reference to facts, buyers are
expected to and do understand
29 6 that they are not entitled to
rely literally upon the words.
However, in a separate section, the Restatement recognizes that
even statements that might otherwise seem like puffery can be
actionable if they are fantastic:
The habit of vendors to exaggerate the advantages of the
bargain that they are offering to make is a well recognized
fact. An intending purchaser may not be justified in relying
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. § 539 cmt. a.
Id.
(emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
§ 542 cmt. e.
Id.
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upon his vendor's statement of the value, quality or other
advantages of a thing that he is intending to sell as carrying
with it any assurance that the thing is such as to justify a
reasonable man in praising it so highly. However, a
purchaser is justified in assuming that even his vendor's
opinion has some basis offact, and therefore in believing
that the vendor knows of nothing which makes his opinion
fantastic."'
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that, consistent with the
reasonable implication test proposed in this Article, the
aforementioned opinions about the car would be potentially
material if the car were, in fact, inoperable. Although no
reasonable investor would interpret these opinions as statements of
fact about the car's relative quality, a reasonable investor would
infer that the car is at least operable.
V. CONCLUSION

In sum, this Article proposes a new analytical framework to
apply to statements of opinion in securities fraud cases. First, this
Article agrees with most courts having addressed the issue that
statements of opinion are only false if both objectively
unreasonable and subjectively disbelieved. 298 The dual-falsity
requirement recognizes that there is "something special" about
opinions, which reflect the speaker's mental processes, and that
this "something special" merits the heightened protection afforded
by the subjective falsity requirement. Additionally, in light of the
consequent necessity of differentiating between statements of fact
and statements of opinion, this Article proposes the following
novel evaluation-inference test: Does the statement express the
speaker's evaluation or inference of facts? 299 This test, which
draws on comparable precedent in the defamation and common
law fraud contexts, pinpoints those statements that contain the
aforementioned "something special." Further, this Article responds
to courts' unsound materiality analyses of opinions by proposing
the following new reasonable implication test to distinguish
statements that are immaterial as a matter of law from those that
are potentially material: Does the opinion reasonably imply an
allegedly false, material fact? 30 0 Comparable precedent developed
in the defamation pure-mixed opinion context and in the common297. Id. § 539 cmt. c (emphasis added).
298. See supra Part III.D.
299. See supra Part III.E.
300. See supra Part IV.C.
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law fraud puffery-opinion context should guide courts as they
apply the reasonable implication test in the securities fraud
context. Securities fraud jurisprudence would benefit from
identifying the "something special" about statements of opinion,
recognizing how an opinion can be false, and distinguishing
opinions that reasonably imply material facts from opinions that are
mere puffery.

